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Case Notes
TORTS-STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND STATE OF THE ART
EVIDENCE IN TExAs-In an Action Based Upon Strict Products
Liability in Tort, Evidence of Unavailability of Safety Devices is
Inadmissible Because Such Evidence is Relevant Only to the Issue
of Care Exercised by the Seller and Does Not Address the Utility
of the Product or the Risk Involved in its Use. Bailey v. Boatland
of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1979, writ filed).
A wrongful death action was brought by the surviving widow
and two adult children of Samuel Bailey, who was killed when
he was thrown from his bass boat on May 27, 1973, on Lake
Livingston, Texas. Plaintiffs brought suit based on strict products
liability in tort against Boatland of Houston, Inc., the seller of the
boat which deceased was operating at the time of his death.
Plaintiffs' pretrial motion to exclude state of the art evidence
concerning the unavailability of kill switches at the time of the
manufacture and sale of the bass boat was denied. The trial court
granted the plaintiffs a running objection to such state of the art
evidence. Based upon the jury's adverse answers to plaintiffs'
special issues the district court entered judgment for the defendant.
Plaintiffs appealed as to the admission of the evidence. Held, re-
versed and remanded: In an action based upon strict products Ha-
l Kill switches are simple mechanical devices which kill the motor of the boat
if the driver of the boat moves more than a short distance from the area of the
boat controls. The device is usually operated by the boat operator clipping a
string to the belt loop of his pants. The other end of the string runs to the
control box beside the driver's seat. When the driver moves more than several
feet from the boat seat the string will trip a switch which kills the motor.
'The jury answered adversely to the plaintiff's special issues inquiring
whether:
1) The boat in question was defective;
2) Decedent misused the boat in question;
3) Decedent failed to follow proper warnings and instructions;
and
4) Decedent assumed the risk of his death.
Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ filed).
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bility in tort, evidence of unavailability of safety devices is inad-
missible because such evidence is relevant only to the issue of care
exercised by the seller, and does not address the utility of the
product or the risk involved in its use. Bailey v. Boatland of
Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1979, writ filed).
I. STRICT LIABILITY IN TEXAS
The basis for modem strict liability was expressed in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' decided by the Supreme Court of
California in 1962. The court determined that if a manufacturer
realizes that a product which he places on the market will be
used without inspection for defects, the manufacturer will be held
strictly liable in tort if the product proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a person.' Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Tortse has incorporated and expanded the basic approach
of Greenman.! The majority of jurisdictions have either adopted
or cited with approval section 402A as the basis for an action in
strict liability.!
359 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
4 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
5 Section 402A reads:
SPECIAL LIABILITY OF SELLER OF PRODUCT FOR PHYSICAL HARM TO
USER OR CONSUMER:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
' The Greenman case involved an element of scienter, whereas section 402A
requires no scienter on the part of the seller or manufacturer.
'See Walkowiak, Product Liability and the Concept of Defective Goods:
"Reasonableness" Revisited?, 44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 705, 706-07 n.7 (1979); 44
J. AIR L. & CoM. 207, 208-09 n.5 (1978); 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 587, 589-90 n.12
(1977).
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In 1967, the Texas Supreme Court, in the companion cases
Shamrock Fuel Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks' and McKisson v. Sales
Affiliates, Inc.,' expressly adopted section 402A and extended
strict liability to all products. The strict liability theory is not based
on negligence or warranty concepts but is founded on public policy
considerations."0 The Texas Supreme Court's adoption of the rule
of strict liability as stated in section 402A arose from the "irre-
futable logic that the rule of strict liability is the only practical
vehicle for protecting the public against harm so often encountered
by innocent users and consumers of defective products.""
According to section 402A, anyone who sells a product in a
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer" is liable for physical harm suffered by the user or con-
sumer from use of the product." The Texas courts have not articu-
lated a precise definition of "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous."'3 However, comment g to section 402A defines a de-
fective condition as "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
'416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
' 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
O There are three primary reasons for imposing strict tort liability on a manu-
facturer or seller of products: (1) The consumer is entitled to rely on the
product being what it purports to be, and not a dangerous instrumentality; (2)
The imposition of such liability upon the manufacturer or seller will act as an
inducement to improve the safety of the product, and serve as a deterrent against
the sale of other defective products; (3) The manufacturer is in a better posi-
tion to bear the loss from a faultless but dangerous product than is the consumer
since the manufacturer can pass the loss on to his other customers and thus
effectively distribute the loss throughout society. See Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); James,
General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24
TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957); Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About
Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329 (1966); Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
" Pittsburgh Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.
1969).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
''See, e.g., Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex.
1979) ("defectively designed" product is "unreasonably dangerous as designed,
taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its
use"); Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Tex. 1975) (defective product
"exposes its user to an unreasonable risk of harm when used for the purposes for
which it was intended"); Pittsburgh Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443
S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. 1969) (product is defective if "not reasonably fit for tho
purposes for which it was intended to be used"). See also Sales & Perdue, The
Law of Strict Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 1, 6 (1976).
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consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.'' "Un-
reasonably dangerous" is defined in comment i as "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics.""
In attempting to determine whether a product is "unreasonably
dangerous," the Texas Supreme Court developed an instruction
for the jury which requires the application of a bifurcated test. In
Henderson v. Ford Motor Co.,6 the court held that in finding a
product "unreasonably dangerous," the jury must determine that
the product as manufactured would not meet the reasonable ex-
pectations of the ordinary consumer as to safety" or that a prudent
manufacturer, aware of the risk involved in its use, would not
have placed such a product in the stream of commerce.'" However,
in Turner v. General Motors Corp.,'9 the court expressly rejected
the bifurcated test advanced in Henderson for determining whether
a product is "unreasonably dangerous."'" The court found that
neither the bifurcated definition of "unreasonably dangerous"'"
nor the definition provided in comment i of section 402A.! had
any place in jury instructions in a strict liability case due to "the
inconclusiveness of the idea that jurors would know what ordi-
nary consumers would expect in the consumption or use of a
product, or that jurors would or could apply any standard or test
14RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g at 351 (1965).
5 Id., comment i at 352.
16 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
'" There was apparently some confusion as to whether the jury instruction
should be given in the conjunctive using "and," or should be given in the dis-
junctive using "or." In Henderson, the court used the disjunctive form. In
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), however, the
lower court had given the bifurcated test in the conjunctive. The supreme court
expressly held that the test was to be given to the jury in the disjunctive using
"or" rather than "and." Id. at 347.
1 Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1974).
'9 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
20Id. at 851.
21 Id.
"1 Id. See note 16 supra, and accompanying text. The court held that hence-
forth the jury instruction set forth as Special Issue Number One, 584 S.W.2d at
847, was to be given instead of the comment i definition of "unreasonably danger-
ous." See note 25 infra.
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outside that of their own experiences and expectations."" The
court held that henceforth no definition of "unreasonably danger-
ous" should be given in strict products liability actions.' Instead,
the jury was to be instructed that the product was defective if the
"product . .. [was] unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking
into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved
in its use."'
Strict liability cases involving product defects generally concern
one of three types of product defects. These three types of defects
are design, manufacturing and marketing defects." A design de-
fect results when a product is marketed in the condition intended
by the manufacturer, but nevertheless, poses a high risk of danger
or inadequately protects from harm to the consumer due to its
design." Both the Turner and Bailey cases involved a design
defect."
Because Turner was a design defect case it is possible that the
risk-utility balancing analysis to be used by the jury is limited to
cases involving design defects. The statement of the Turner court
that "henceforth in the trial of strict liability cases involving de-
sign defects the issue and accompanying instructions will not in-
23 584 S.W.2d at 851.
'Other courts that have eliminated the "unreasonably dangerous" termi-
nology from section 402A have found that strict liability can function just as
effectively without this qualification. See Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358
F. Supp. 976 (D. Alaska 1973) (applying Alaska law); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
584 S.W.2d at 847. Special Issue Number One states:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the
time the [product] in question was manufactured by [the manufac-
turer] the [product] was defectively designed?
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant
a product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into
consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in
its use.
Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv.
1, 7-26 (1976).
"2 See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 30 (1973); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in
the Manufacturing and Design of Products, 20 SYRAcusE L. REV. 559 (1969).
2 8Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979). In
Bailey, the bass boat was marketed in the condition intended by the manufacturer.
Furthermore there was a question in the case of whether the product inade-
quately protected the consumer from harm due to its design. Thus, Bailey con-
cerned a design defect although the court never discussed the case as such.
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dude either the element of the ordinary consumer or of the pru-
dent manufacturer,""0 lends strong support to the theory that the
risk-utility analysis will only be applied in design defect cases.
If the Turner court had intended that the risk-utility analysis
apply in manufacturing or marketing defect cases, the court pre-
sumably would have mentioned those defects in the above state-
ment.
II. STATE OF THE ART EVIDENCE IN STRICT LIABILITY
The issue of admissibility of state of the art evidence typically
arises in a product liability case when it is alleged that the product
is defective because of unreasonably dangerous design or failure
to incorporate safeguards or protective devices which are tech-
nologically feasible.' There are actually two interrelated doctrines
that are often referred to as state of the art.3' The first type of
state of the art evidence concerns whether the defendant has con-
formed to the industry-wide standards in design and manufacture
of the product. The second type of state of the art evidence is in-
tended to show that at the time the product was designed and
manufactured, the state of scientific knowledge was such that the
product could not be made safer.
A. State of the Art Evidence to Prove Conformity with the Pre-
vailing Custom of the Industry
The custom of the industry type of state of the art evidence has
met strong resistance in strict liability cases in several jurisdic-
tions.' The basis for the inadmissibility of such evidence is
29 584 S.W.2d at 847.
"0See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1976);
Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976 (D. Alaska 1973); Atkins
v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Cunningham
v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Matthews
v. Stewart, 20 Ill. App. 3d 470, 314 N.E.2d 683 (1974).
" See Karasik, State of the Art or Science: Is it a Defense to Products Lia-
bility?, 60 ILL. B.J. 348, 350-51 (1972); Murray, The State of the Art Defense
in Strict Products Liability, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 649, 651-52 (1974); 43 J. AIR L.
& COM. 587, 590-92 (1977).
" See Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); Cun-
ningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Il1. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970),
discussed in Blohm v. Bardwell Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1967);
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founded in section 402A. According to section 402A(2) (a), the
seller or manufacturer may be held strictly liable even though
"the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product."' Under traditional negligence theory the de-
fendant may introduce evidence of the custom of the industry in
order to establish the standard of care required of the defendant."
If he has met the standard of care set by the custom of the com-
munity he will absolve himself of liability based on negligence.
In a strict liability action based on section 402A(2) (a), however,
liability is imposed upon the manufacturer regardless of the care
he has exercised. Custom of the industry type of state of the art
evidence is therefore irrelevant in a strict products liability action
when it is introduced to establish a defendant's standard of care.
Furthermore, Judge Learned Hand in 1932 expressed a strong
public policy reason for denying introduction of the custom type
of state of the art evidence when he stated in The T. J. Hooper'
that, "a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of
new and available devices. It never may set its own test, however
persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is re-
quired."' Although liability in The T. J. Hooper was based on
negligence, the public policy reasoning is equally applicable to
strict products liability.
Other jurisdictions have held that the custom type of state of
the art evidence is admissible to show that a product is not "de-
fective" as defined in section 402A."7 As stated earlier, in order
to impose liability under section 402A, the product must be in a
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous." The product is un-
reasonably dangerous if the article is "dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary con-
Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 111. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1956);
Murray, supra note 31, at 652-53.
3RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A(2)(a) (1965).
34See, e.g., Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Il1. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231
(1956), discussed in Murray, supra note 31, at 649-51.
60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
Id. at 740.
"
7 See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1976); Olson
v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972); Baker v. Chrysler
Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1976); Hamilton v. Hardy,
37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976); Jackson v. Biloxi, 272 So. 2d 654
(Miss. 1973); Murray, supra note 31, at 653-55.
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sumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics."38 The ordinary consumer's
expectations therefore govern whether a product is defective as
defined in section 402A. Several courts have allowed defendants
to introduce custom type of state of the art evidence under section
402A.' One commentator has discussed the reasoning of those
courts:
Since whether or not a product is defective depends upon whether
or not the danger involved in its use would be apparent to a
reasonable consumer, state of the art evidence can be useful in
establishing that the product involved is similar to all other prod-
ucts of that type and therefore an ordinary consumer ... with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its character-
istics would have realized the potential danger . . . since the
machine represents the highest degree of safety attainable at the
time, as evidenced by other manufacturer's products, while still
being functional, it was not defective because it didn't represent a
danger which would not be anticipated by a reasonable consumer."
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i at 352 (1965).
1 See, e.g., Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1976); Back v.
Wickes Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1874, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978); Thibault v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); 2 L. FRUMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 16A [4] [i] (1979).
4OMurray, supra note 31, at 654-55. Jurisdictions which permit introduction
of this type of evidence appear to allow the evidence to be used only in an
offensive posture and not in a defensive posture. As an example, several cases
hold that the defendant may use this type of evidence to prove that a product
is not defective but make no mention of whether a plaintiff may use such evi-
dence. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973); Jackson v. Biloxi, 272 So. 2d 654 (Miss. 1973).
It could be argued that the reasoning advanced by Murray to support the
introduction by a defendant seller or manufacturer of custom type of state of
the art evidence could just as easily be used to support introduction of such
evidence by the plaintiff. In such a situation Murray's argument could be re-
worded to support use of custom type of state of the art evidence while still
maintaining its logical consistency. When reworded to support use of the evidence
by the plaintiff, Murray's argument would read:
Since whether or not a product is defective depends upon whether
or not the danger involved in its use would be apparent to a reason-
able consumer, state of the art evidence can be useful in establishing
that the product involved is similar to all other products of that type
and therefore an ordinary consumer . . . with the ordinary knowl-
edge common to the community as to its characteristics would
not have realized the potential danger . . . since the machine repre-
sents the highest degree of safety attainable at the time, as evi-
denced by other manufacturer's products, while still being func-
tional, it was defective because it did represent a danger which
CASENOTES
B. State of the Art Evidence as Proof that the Product was as Safe
as was Technologically Feasible when Designed and Manufac-
tured
The second variety of state of the art evidence is that which
shows that the level of scientific knowledge was such that at the
time the product was designed and manufactured it was techno-
logically unfeasible to make the product safer. In using this type, of
state of the art evidence the emphasis is not on what other manu-
facturers are doing, but instead concerns whether the manufac-
turer has used all available technological skill and scientific knowl-
edge to manufacture a safe product.' Most jurisdictions have not
hesitated to accept this evidence in strict liability actions, ' the one
notable exception to this rule being the state of Illinois.4'
The technological type of state of the art evidence is also useful
to demonstrate that a product was "unavoidably unsafe" within
the meaning of section 402A, comment k." According to comment
would not be anticipated by a reasonable consumer. (changes
italicized).
'Murray, supra note 31, at 652.
1 Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (1974); Phillips
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that any type of state of the art
evidence is inadmissible in an action based on strict products liability. Cunning-
ham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). See
Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973).
"Comment k to § 402A reads:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their in-
tended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field
of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious
and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease
itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and
the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the un-
avoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The
same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of
which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to phy-
sicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because
of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience,
there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of
ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing
and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.
The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they
1980]
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k, the seller of a product which in the present state of human
knowledge is incapable of being made safe for its intended and
ordinary use, "is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences... merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparent risk."' ' Such a product, if properly pre-
pared and accompanied by proper warnings and directions is not
defective nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Thus, state of the
art evidence is relevant under comment k to demonstrate that the
"present state of human knowledge" is such that the product
could not be made any safer. Once the seller has demonstrated
that the product is as safe as is technically possible and that it
has been properly manufactured and labeled, the product will fall
under the comment k exception to strict liability imposed by sec-
tion 402A if the utility of the product justifies the risk. The most
common type of products which fall under comment k are phar-
maceuticals."
III. Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805
(Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, writ filed).
An extensive review of case law in Texas reveals that the ques-
tion of admissibility and relevance of state of the art evidence
in strict products liability is one of first impression." In the trial
court, plaintiff elicited testimony from the inventor of the kill
are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he
has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reason-
able risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k at 353-54 (1965).
id.
46ld.
"' See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Hines
v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (1974). Comment k has also
been used in non-drug cases when the product is an apparently useful and desir-
able one but is attended with elements of unquestioned danger. Borel v. Fibre-
board Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 830 (1974).
" Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ filed).
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switches:" that the device is a simple mechanical one that would
greatly increase the safety of boats.' Testimony was also adduced
that the concept of kill switches was not a new concept since
various types of kill switches had been used on racing boats for
over thirty years. 1 The inventor developed the kill switch for bass
boats in November of 1972 and applied for a patent on the device
in January of 1973." The accident in question occurred on May
27, 1973.' No one knew of the specifics of the inventor's kill
switch until it was manufactured and marketed in August of 1974."
Expert witnesses for the defendant indicated the kill switches
existed as a concept and various kinds were in limited use prior to
the manufacture of the bass boat in question but none were com-
mercially available at the time.' Defendant also introduced evi-
dence indicating that the placement of kill switches on bass boats
was not the accepted industrial practice because kill switches were
not commercially available."
It was the admission of the evidence introduced by the defendant
and the testimony of its expert witnesses to which the plaintiffs
objected at the time of trial, and to which plaintiffs were granted
a running objection by the trial court. 7 The plaintiffs contended
that such state of the art evidence regarding unavailability is only
relevant to establish the "care" exercised by the manufacturer in
designing the boat, an issue which is immaterial in a strict liability
action. The plaintiffs argued, therefore, that the admission of the
evidence in question constituted reversible error.
In holding that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the
unavailability of kill switches at the time of the manufacturing and
selling of the boat, the court of appeals relied heavily on the re-
cent Texas Supreme Court decision in Turner v. General Motors
4 5 See note 1 and accompanying text, supra.




, Id. at 807-08. The inventor's personal investigation revealed that prior to
this time no other kill switch was marketed, although some people had impro-
vised homemade kill switches for their boats. Id.
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Corp.' As was noted,"9 the Turner court determined that the sec-
tion 402A definition of "unreasonably dangerous" could not be
given to the jury in a strict products liability action. The product
would be defective if the product was unreasonably dangerous,
considering the utility of the product and the risk involved in its
use.®
The Turner court expressly held that evidence bearing "upon
the factors of risk and utility"'" may be admissible in the trial of
58 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
" See notes 20-25 and accompanying text, supra.
60 584 S.W.2d at 847. See note 25 supra.
61 In Turner, the Court of Civil Appeals had instructed the jury to consider
four specific factors when balancing the utility of the product against the risk
involved in its use to determine whether the product is defective. These factors
were:
1) the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a
whole weighed against the gravity and likelihood of injury from its
use;
2) the availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive;
3) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
the product without seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly
increasing its cost;
4) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability because of general public knowledge
of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of
suitable warnings or instructions.
General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1978). These four
factors, as well as others not enumerated by the Court of Civil Appeals, have
been suggested in various law review articles. See Dickerson, Products Liability:
How Good Does a Product Have To Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 331 (1967) (five
factors); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" In the
Manufacture and Design Of Products, 20 SYRAcusE L. REV. 559, 565-66 (1969)
(four factors); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Adminis-
tration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 818
(1976) (four factors); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protec-
tion: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA.
L. REV. 1109, 1370-71 (1974) (thirteen factors); Tisileu, Products Liability-
The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 359 (1974) (fifteen factors);
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
837-40 (1973) (revised seven factors); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manu-
facturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965) (seven factors); 43 J. AIR L. & CoM. 587,
595 (1977) (applying the seven revised factors suggested by Dean Wade to state
of the art evidence in strict products liability).
However, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the jury was not to be in-
structed to balance specific factors of risk of harm against utility due to "the
difficulty of formulating a series of specific factors" for the jury to use in its
balancing process. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 848-49
(Tex. 1979). The supreme court's finding is supported by the inability of the
scholars listed above to agree upon the relevant factors to be given to the jury for
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strict liability cases.' Thus, the Bailey court held that, according
to the mandate of Turner, the manufacturer is free to introduce
all available evidence concerning the engineering and design fea-
tures of the product in order to show that it is not unreasonably
dangerous.' In Bailey, the court of appeals found that the evi-
dence of the unavailability of kill switches did not address the
"utility" of the product or establish the process by which the design
was adopted." The evidence only emphasized the care exercised
by the manufacturer, and other manufacturers, in designing the
boat in question.' Therefore, such state of the art evidence was
held to be inadmissible.
IV. EFFECT OF BAILEY ON STATE OF THE ART EVIDENCE IN TEXAS
In denying the admission of the evidence, the Bailey court has
merely made a logical extension of the Texas Supreme Court's
holding in Turner. The outcome of Turner was to streamline jury
instructions in strict products liability actions. The Bailey decision
has extended the Turner holding on jury instructions into evi-
dentiary issues. Thus, Bailey has expanded a procedural rule into
a substantive rule of law.
The evidence introduced by the defendants in Bailey is of the
custom variety and is not of the technological variety. The evi-
dence was introduced to show the custom of the industry and
to demonstrate that the ordinary consumer would have been
aware of the risk involved in using the boat. The evidence was
not applied in the technological sense because the evidence itself
indicates that the concept and technology of kill switches had
been in existence for thirty years. The defendant would intro-
duce technological type of state of the art evidence only if it
tended to prove that the state of technology was such that the
product could not be made more safe at the time of the accident.
consideration. See Donaher, Piebler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological
Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1303, 1307-08 (1974);
Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B; A Decade of Litigation,
54 TEx. L. REV. 1185, 1203-06 (1976).
61 584 S.W.2d at 847.
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Thus, in Bailey the defendant introduced the evidence in an at-
tempt to indicate the custom of the industry and not the tech-
nology at the time of the accident.
The Bailey decision properly interprets the Turner decision to
mean that custom of the industry type of state of the art evidence 6
is henceforth irrelevant and thus inadmissible, at least in strict
products liability cases involving design defects"7 in Texas. The
mandate by the Supreme Court of Texas that any definition of
"unreasonably dangerous" can no longer be given to the jury
logically implies that custom type of state of the art evidence is
irrelevant. The primary relevance that custom type of state of the
art evidence has to products liability cases would be to show that
the product is similar to all other products of that type, and, there-
fore, the ordinary consumer with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics would have realized the
potential danger. Since the section 402A definition of "unreason-
ably dangerous" is no longer available as a jury instruction, the
expectations of the ordinary consumer, based upon the design of
all other products of a similar type, is no longer a valid criteria for
determining whether a product is defective. Therefore, evidence
tending to show the custom of the industry or to imply that "every-
one else is doing it" 8 is irrelevant to strict products, liability.
As stated earlier, Turner held that evidence upon the factors of
risk and utility of the product may be admissible in the trial of
products liability cases." From this holding the argument could
be made that custom type of state of the art evidence is relevant
to the utility of the product or the risk involved in its use. How-
ever, the Bailey court flatly rejected this contention." The court's
analysis rests upon the premise that the evidence of the kill switch
emphasizes the care exercised by the manufacturer and other
manufacturers in designing the boat.
In reaching the conclusion that the evidence is relevant only to
the care exercised by the manufacturer, and, therefore, irrelevant
to all other issues, the court effectively sidesteps the issue of
See notes 29-37 and accompanying text, supra.
See notes 26-28 and accompanying text, supra.
' 585 S.W.2d at 811. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
e' See note 25 and accompanying text, supra.
o585 S.W.2d at 811.
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whether custom type of state of the art evidence has any relevance
to risk and utility or the process by which the product was designed.
This sidestepping of the issue is crucial to the outcome of the case.
If the custom type of evidence has any relevance to these issues,"'
then according to Turner such evidence must be admissible.
Custom type of evidence is irrelevant to the utility of the product
or the risk involved in its use for the simple reason that no logical
connection can be drawn between the two. Product utility con-
cers the value and usefulness of the product to the consumer or
the public as a whole. Custom type of evidence has no relevance
to such value judgments. Furthermore, custom type of evidence
has no relevance to the process by which the design is adopted.
The features of a particular design and the process by which the
design is adopted depend strictly upon the technological capacity
of the industry at the time. Custom type of evidence is relevant
only to whether or not the industry as a whole has adopted a par-
ticular safety feature. It is not relevant to whether or not the
manufacturer was technologically capable of developing and manu-
facturing the design which would have made the product less
dangerous to use.
Although the Bailey decision effectively bars the introduction of
custom type of state of the art evidence, the court leaves open the
question of whether technological type of state of the art evidence
is admissible. The court states that "the manufacturer is free to
introduce all available evidence of the engineering and design
features of the product in order to show that it is not unreasonably
dangerous."" In concluding that the admission of the evidence of
the unavailability of the kill switch was erroneous, the court of
appeals stated that such evidence "did not address the 'utility' of
the product or establish the process by which the design was
adopted."" The technological type of state of the art evidence
"Under Murray's analysis, custom type of evidence would be admissible
even though the evidence does not address the risk or utility of the product. See
notes 36-39 and accompanying text, supra. However, since the Bailey court re-
jected Murray's analysis, it is apparent that the obviousness of the danger to the
reasonable consumer is unimportant to the question of whether custom type of
evidence is admissible. Thus, custom of the industry evidence can be introduced
in Texas only if it has some relevance to the risk and utility of the product.
72585 S.W.2d at 811.
73 id.
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would bear directly upon the method by which the product design
was adopted. Thus, the implication can be drawn from the court's
holding that such evidence is admissible in a strict products lia-
bility case. A logical extension of the court's holding leads to the
conclusion that technological type of state of the art evidence
would be admissible to show that the product is "unavoidably un-
safe" within the comment k exception to strict liability under sec-
tion 402A.'
The importance to the aviation industry of whether state of the
art evidence is admissible in products liability actions was aptly
demonstrated in Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp.T In Bruce, thirty-
two members of the Wichita State football team were killed when
the chartered aircraft in which they were traveling crashed into
the mountains in 1970. The impact caused a number of the seats
to tear loose from their floor attachments and be thrown to the
front of the aircraft, thereby blocking the exit. The plaintiffs con-
tended that the design and manufacture of the seats and seat
fastenings were defective in that the crash would have been sur-
vivable if seats in common use in 1970 had been installed on the
aircraft. 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"
allowed the defendants to introduce state of the art evidence, '
holding that such evidence was important to demonstrate the rea-
sonable expectations of the ordinary consumer for purposes of
determining whether the product was "unreasonably dangerous"
'See notes 41-44 and accompanying text, supra.
'544 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1976). See 43 J. AIR L. & CoM. 587 (1977)
(discussion of Bruce).
76 At the time of the crash in 1970, the aircraft still had the original seats
and seat fastenings that were installed on the aircraft when it was manufactured
in 1952. 544 F.2d at 446.
" The district court concluded that the laws of Missouri applied to determine
the liability of Ozark Airlines and the laws of Maryland applied to determine
Martin's liability. This was not challenged by either party on appeal. Bruce v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 443, 444-46 (10th Cir. 1976). In diversity cases
the federal courts apply conflict of law rules which conform to those prevailing in
the state courts in which the federal court is located. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1940). In Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632
(Okla. 1974), the "significant contacts" test for conflict of law questions in
tort cases was adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
78 544 F.2d at 446.
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and thus "defective" as defined by section 402A."' In admitting
the evidence based on the section 402A comment i definition
of "unreasonably dangerous," the Tenth Circuit used an analysis
no longer available in Texas." Since the section 402A comment i
definition was rejected in Turner, such state of the art evidence
would not be admissible in Texas&.8 The Texas courts, according to
Bailey, would exclude such evidence from the trial if the evidence
was introduced merely to show that all other manufacturers used
such fastenings in 1952 and not to prove that such fastenings were
the safest type technologically available at the time.
The imposition of strict liability on the manufacturer or seller
for the design, manufacture and sale of defective products is re-
quired by public policy considerations." If the Bailey court had
excluded both the custom and technological type of state of the
art evidence,' the court would, in effect, have imposed absolute
liability upon the manufacturer or seller." On the other hand,
the admission of both types of state of the art evidence would
have allowed the negligence concept of the "reasonable consumer"
to creep into state of the art products liability cases in Texas. By
denying introduction of the custom type of state of the art evidence
while implying that the technological type of state of the art evi-
dence is admissible, the court has provided Texas with a very
logical approach to the treatment of products liability cases. In
leaving the door open for the admission of technological state of
the art evidence, Bailey has refused to impose absolute liability
on the manufacturer. At the same time, refusal to admit custom
type of state of the art evidence has successfully removed the negli-
'Old. at 447.
0Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). For a dis-
cussion of Turner and the rejection by the Texas Supreme Court of the section
402A comment i definition of "unreasonably dangerous," see notes 19-25 and
accompanying text, supra.
81 See 43 J. AIR L. & CoM. 587, 598 (1977) (concluding that evidence of seat
fastenings was custom type and not technological type of state of the art evi-
dence).
82 See note 11 and accompanying text, supra.
"a See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d
897 (1970).
4Various commentators have expressed the viewpoint that "strict liability" is
not meant to impose "absolute liability." See Prosser, Strict Liability to the
Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23 (1966); Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830-33 (1973).
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gence concept of the reasonable consumer from the question of
admissibility of state of the art evidence.'
In the final analysis, the distinction between the two types of state
of the art evidence is somewhat strained. The distinction is tenuous
because in most cases either party may argue that the evidence is
custom or technological depending on which type of evidence will
best serve the respective party's interest. Thus, the focus of the
courts should not rest upon what type of state of the art evidence
the parties contend they are presenting, but should focus upon the
purpose for which the party is using the evidence. If the evidence
is directed to the technological ability of the manufacturer to
make the product safer, then the evidence should be admissible so
as not to impose absolute liability on the manufacturer. On the
other hand, if the state of the art evidence is intended to point out
the custom of the industry then the evidence should be labeled by
the court as custom type and the evidence should be excluded.
David P. Dyer
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM
HOUR PROVISIONS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-Airport
Employees Are Not Covered by the Minimum Wage and Maximum
Hour Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act Because the
Operation of a Municipally-Owned Airport is an Integral Govern-
mental Function by the Standards Set Forth in National League of
Cities v. Usery. Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033
(6th Cir. 1979).
Employees and former employees of the city department which
operated Cleveland's municipally-owned airport brought suit against
the city under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).' Plaintiffs
See generally Wade, The Continuing Development of Strict Liability in
Tort, 22 ARK. L. REV. 233, 242 (1968). See also Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.
Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), af'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Cunning-
ham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 I11. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
129 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976). The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted
by Congress in 1938 under the authority of the commerce power. The purpose of
the Act is to prevent labor conditions which are detrimental to maintaining
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sought to recover wages, unpaid overtime, vacation pay, and sick
pay under the minimum wage and maximum hou? provisions of
the FLSA. They alleged that at various times during their employ-
ment they had worked in excess of forty hours per week at less
than the rates of pay established under the FLSA. Claiming that
under the terms of the FLSA, the city was an "enterprise" which
was engaged in interstate commerce," the plaintiffs prayed for
damages and injunctive relief. In responding to the plaintiff's
arguments, the city alleged that the employees were excluded
from the general wage and hour provisions of the FLSA,' and that
minimum standards of living necessary for the general health and well-being of
workers. Congress found that poor labor conditions burdened commerce and
resulted in unfair methods of competition in commerce. Two of the primary
benefits are the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions.
229 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1976):
(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,
wages ...
(1) not less than $2.65 an hour during the year beginning
January 1, 1978, not less than $2.90 an hour during the
year beginning January 1, 1979,.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1976):
(a) (1) [N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in
any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enter-
prise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours
unless such employee receives compensation for his em-
ployment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate
of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at
which he is employed.
329 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1976):
(r) "Enterprise" means the related activities performed .. .by any
person or persons for a common business purpose . .. the
activities performed by any person or persons-
(3) in connection with the activities of a public agency, shall
be deemed to be activities performed for a business pur-
pose.
"29 U.S.C. § 203(s) & (x) (1976):
(s) "Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce" means an enterprise which has employees en-
gaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com-
merce .. . , and which-
(6) is an activity of a public agency-
(x) "Public agency" means ... the government of a State or a
political subdivision . . .. any agency of a State or a political
subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental agency.
' This defense was not at issue on appeal since the district court dismissed
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the provisions were unconstitutional under National League of
Cities v. Usery as applied to employees of the city's municipally-
owned airport. Plaintiffs responded that National League of Cities
was inapplicable because the operation of a municipal airport is
a "proprietary" rather than a "governmental" function." In re-
jecting plaintiffs' analysis of National League of Cities, the district
court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted! Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, assigning as error the district court's
putative misapplication of the holding in National League of
Cities by its refusal to recognize the operation of a municipal air-
port as a proprietary rather than a governmental function.' Held,
affirmed: Airport employees are not covered by the minimum wage
and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
because the operation of a municipally-owned airport is an integral
governmental function by the standard set forth in National League
of Cities v. Usery. Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033
(6th Cir. 1979).
Prior to National League of Cities the Supreme Court consist-
ently rejected state sovereignty claims as a limitation to Congress'
use of the commerce power."0 State-owned railroads were held sub-
the action for failure to state a claim. As a result, the court of appeals declined
to express a view on the argument that plaintiffs were firemen and exempted
from the general wage and hour provisions of the FLSA. Amersbach v. City of
Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1034 n.1 (6th Cir. 1979). See 29 U.S.C.. § 207(k)
(1976).
1 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In National
League of Cities the Court held that the 1974 amendments to the FLSA were
unconstitutional as applied to state and municipal employees. The Court reasoned
that the amendments were an impermissible interference with the states'
sovereignty whenever they intruded on the traditional and integral governmental
functions of the state. See notes 29-33 infra and the accompanying text.
'See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971). An activity
is considered to be "governmental" whenever the government is acting in a
"political" or "public" capacity, whereas a "proprietary" function is viewed as a
"corporate" or "private" activity of the government. The classification of par-
ticular functions as governmental or proprietary has, however, proved to be
confusing and difficult. Id.
Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1034 (6th Cir. 1979).
'Id. No formal opinion was issued by the district court since it granted the
defendants' motion for a judgment on the pleadings.
lO U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. Judicial interpretation of the commerce clause
has played a significant role in shaping the concepts of federalism. The Supreme
Court has interpreted the commerce clause as a complete grant of power to
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ject to federal regulations enacted by congressional use of the
commerce power.' State universities,1" state water projects, 3 and
even state boundaries" were required to obey federal regulations
which were intended to protect interstate commerce. When the
Court initially tested and upheld the constitutionality of the FLSA,
it rejected any interest reserved to the states under the tenth
amendment,"3 and, thereby effectively allowed the federal govern-
ment to disregard state sovereignty claims as long as it acted
within the commerce power."
In Maryland v. Wirtz" the Court continued to reject state
sovereignty claims as a defense to the commerce power. By up-
holding the constitutionality of the 1966 amendments to the
FLSA," the Court in Wirtz subjected the employees of state hos-
Congress. Only recently has the Court revived the tenth amendment as a check
on the federal government's ability to control the activities of state governments.
See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONS-nTUTIONAL
LAW 128-63 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
"United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (Federal Safety Appli-
ance Act of 1893 applicable to state-owned and operated railroad; rejection of
any state sovereignty limitation on Congress' power to regulate commerce);
United States v. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70 (1933) (intrastate rates of state-owned
railroad allowed to be regulated by federal government in order to eliminate dis-
crimination in interstate commerce).
12 Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (state university
required to pay federal import duty on scientific instruments imported through
interstate commerce). The principle of duality in our system of government does
not limit Congress' authority to regulate commerce. Id. at 57.
1' Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925) (allowed federal
regulation of a state's diversion of water since federal commerce power is superior
to state power to provide for services of its citizens).
4 Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941)
(Congress allowed to build dam in order to control navigable water, even though
it changed a state's boundary).
'
5 U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
1 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). The Court gave little
effect to the tenth amendment by stating that it was but a mere "truism." See
Note, 8 TEx. TECH L. REV. 403, 408 (1976).
17392 U.S. 183 (1968).
1629 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1966):
(s) "Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce" means an enterprise which...
(5) is engaged in the operation of a hospital, an institution
primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the
mentally ill.., a school for mentally or physically handi-
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pitals, institutions, and schools to the minimum wage and hour
requirements." In Fry v. United States" the wage and salary freezes
of the Economic Stabilization Act of 19701 were held applicable
to state employees.' The Court rejected the argument that the
states are immune from federal regulation under the commerce
clause because of their sovereign status.'
By recognizing the sovereignty of a state as a constitutional
limitation on congressional use of the commerce power, the Court's
decision in National League of Cities halted the trend that had
steadily developed." In National League of Cities various states
and cities challenged the constitutionality of the 1974 amend-
ments to the FLSA' which brought state and municipal employees
under the coverage of the minimum wage and hour provisions."0
The plaintiffs argued that by extending coverage to all employees
of state and municipal governments, Congress violated the estab-
lished constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity."'
The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs and concluded that
since the states play an essential role in a federal system of govern-
capped children, a preschool, elementary or secondary
school, or an institution of higher education ....
19 392 U.S. at 183.
20421 U.S. 542 (1975).
U 12 U.S.C. § 1904(201-220) (1970).
12 421 U.S. at 545.
23Id. at 548.
24National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 845.
m29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1974):
(d) "Employer" includes any person acting directly or indirectly
in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and
includes a public agency ...
(2) In the case of an individual employed by a public agency,
such term means-
(c) any individual employed by a State, political sub-
division of a State, or an interstate governmental
agency.
426 U.S. at 834.
27 Id. at 837. The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity originated in the
Supreme Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
In McCulloch the Court held a state tax on the Bank of the United States to be
invalid by noting that the power to tax has the potential to destroy. The doctrine
has expanded throughout this century to limit not only state laws that frustrate
federal activities, but also federal interference in state activities. In recent years
the doctrine has become a significant limitation on congressional use of the
commerce power. See generally NOWAK, supra note 10, at 367.
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ment,2' congressional use of the commerce power must be limited
whenever it interferes with the integral governmental function of
the states." In attempting to formulate a test for the state sov-
ereignty doctrine, the Court stated that congressional interference
would not be allowed if it infringed upon "functions essential to
the separate and independent existence" of the states.' In order
for a state function to be considered "essential," it must meet
two criteria. First, the activity must be within an area of traditional
state power,"' and second, the activity must be such that any inter-
ference by the federal government would significantly alter or
displace state policy. ' The Court added state hospitals, institutions,
and schools to the list of traditional functions by expressly over-
ruling Wirtz.' In reaffirming its recent decision in Fry, however,
the Court noted that the regulations of the Economic Stabilization
Act dealt only with federal emergencies and displaced no state
choices concerning the structure of governmental operations." The
Court also held that the tenth amendment is to be an affirmative
constitutional limitation on the federal use of the commerce power
in regulating the traditional activities of the states, thus barring
any use of the commerce power which could threaten the ability
of states to function as separate entities in a federal system of
government.' Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Na-
tional League of Cities, viewed the Court's analysis as a balancing
approach.' He noted that in some instances the federal interest
21426 U.S. at 851.
29 Id.
30Id. at 845, (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) and
Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
31 426 U.S. at 851. The Court listed fire prevention, police protection, sanita-
tion, public health, parks, and recreation as examples of functions traditionally per-
formed by the states. Id.
"Id. at 847. The Court noted that the increased cost alone would have a
significant impact on the state's ability to provide certain public services. The
FLSA amendments would also affect the manner in which states structure delivery
of the services by preventing the hiring of inexperienced workers at lower rates
of pay. Id. at 848. See Note, 8 TEx. TECH L. REV. 403, 404 (1976). In Amers-
bach the court referred to this test as the "traditional-integral" test. 598 F.2d at
1036. This paper will use the same terminology when referring to it.
426 U.S. at 854.
34Id. at 852-53.
5Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 856. National League of Cities resulted in a 5-4 decision. Blackmun's
concurring opinion was the deciding vote.
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involved would be considerably greater than the state's interest
in sovereignty; in those instances, compliance with federal regula-
tions would be essential'
Since National League of Cities was decided, courts have de-
termined that there are certain areas in which the doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity does not apply. Courts have uniformly
held 8 that the doctrine was not intended to apply to the equal pay
provisions of the FLSA.3 The courts have reasoned that the purpose
of these provisions is to protect against discrimination based on sex
and age, and that these provisions have a decidedly less direct and
intrusive impact on state governmental functions.' It also has been
held that federal interference in the states' vocational rehabilitation
programs and food stamp programs, and the federal government's
ability to exercise exclusive control over the level of rents in fed-
erally subsidized housing projects does not constitute interference
with traditional and integral functions of the states." The courts
viewed the programs as having no impact on state policy decisions
which are essential to the state's sovereignty. Two of the courts
noted that it has long been upheld as an unobjectionable exercise of
the spending power' to place conditions on federal grants of money
to the states." Besides vocational and food stamp programs, the
17 Id. at 856.
n' See note 40 infra.
" See notes 42-47 infra, and the accompanying text.
40Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978); Usery v.
Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976); Brown v. County
of Santa Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Usery v. Edward J.
Meyer Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Christensen v.
Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
41 Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 274, 284
(N.D. Fla. 1978). The narrow holding of National League of Cities is restricted
to federal regulations that "directly displace" the power of the states to organize
their own governments as they see fit. This rationale has no application where
federal intrusion is indirect and limited to measures which insure the proper
functioning of federally funded programs. Id.; see also, City of Boston v. Hills,
420 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Mass. 1976). HUD's ability to exercise control over level
of rents in federally subsidized housing projects has no impact whatsoever on
any state determination essential to state's sovereignty. Id. at 1298; Dupler v.
City of Portland, 421 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Me. 1976). Federal interference with
state food stamp program does not displace state policy essential to sovereignty
of states. Id. at 1320.
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "Congress shall have the Power To... provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."
I Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 274, 284
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supplying of electrical service by the state" and the state's opera-
tion of an oil and gas business" have also been held not to consti-
tute traditional-integral governmental functions.
Many courts, however, have relied on National League of Cities
to further the doctrine of state sovereignty in other areas. It has
been held that the minimum wage and hour provisions of the FLSA
do not apply to court reporters who were employees of the state's
judicial court system." It has also been held that a federal tax
imposed on state civil aircraft violates the doctrine of intergovern-
mental immunity." The tax affected the state's policy choices in
determining whether air travel is the most efficient means through
which to accomplish its governmental obligations." State licensing
of automobile drivers is another area that has been held to be an
integral state function."
Other courts," in relying on the doctrine of state sovereignty,
have stated holdings that are contrary to Justice Blackmun's bal-
ancing approach set forth in National League of Cities in which
he stressed the federal government's keen interest in environmental
matters." The courts held that the federal government may neither
(N.D. Fla. 1978); Dupler v. City of Portland, 421 F. Supp. 1314, 1320-21
(D. Me. 1976).
'Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 424 (1978).
"Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulation Comm'n, 587 F.2d 716,
721 (5th Cir. 1979).
41 Association of Court Reporters of Superior Court v. Superior Court for
Dist. of Columbia, 424 F. Supp. 90 (D.C. Cir. 1976). This case held that the
D.C. Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473
(1970), gave the state court system complete authority to establish compensation
rates for nonjudicial court personnel. 424 F. Supp. at 94.
47 Georgia Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ga.
1976).
48 Id. at 826. The court noted that National League of Cities failed to clarify
whether undue interference was intended to be in terms of the directness or the
magnitude of the impact which the federal legislation has upon state goals.
Although the amount in this instance was minimal ($4,000), it was still significant
enough to affect state policy. Id. at 825.
4" United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978).
5EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977), on remand, 566 F.2d 665 (9th Cir.
1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977);
District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom.
EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir.
1975), vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
" National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 856. See notes 38 and 39
and accompanying text supra.
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impose sanctions on a state for failing to implement or enforce the
Environmental Protection Agency's anti-pollution regulations,"
nor order a state to draft such a plan." The federal imposition of
various anti-pollution plans was viewed by one court as posing
serious tenth amendment problems.' Another court noted that
National League of Cities requires that the judiciary be reluctant
to declare the federal government a winner when conflicts develop
between state and federal authorities.'
Faced with these recent legal developments and using National
League of Cities as the controlling precedent, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Amersbach" extended the ruling in National
League of Cities to the employees of municipally-owned airports."
The court began its analysis by noting that the state sovereignty
limitation on congressional power under the commerce clause has
been restricted to situations where the following requirements
are met." It must be shown (1) that Congress has used its power
under the commerce clause in such a manner as to "displace, regu-
late, or significantly alter," (2) the "management, structure, or
operation" of a (3) "traditional or integral governmental func-
tion."" The court stated that the first two requirements, dealing
with displacement of state policy, were easily met in this case,
since the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA would be direct
mandates to the city." The provisions would also alter the employer-
employee relationship by interfering with the hours and wages of
the employees."' The third requirement was not as easily met by
52 Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1977); District of Columbia
v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
"Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 225 (4th Cir. 1975).
District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The
regulations required states to enact statutes and to administer and enforce pro-
grams contained in the Environmental Protection Agency's plan. The tenth
amendment may prevent Congress from selecting methods of regulation which
are drastic invasions of state sovereignty when less intrusive means are available.
Id.
5Brown v. EPA, 566 F.2d 665, 672 (9th Cir. 1977).
5 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979).
57 Id. at 1034.
"I Id. at 1035.




the facts presented, and the court determined that it was the con-
trolling issue of the case-whether or not the operation of a mu-
nicipally-owned airport is a traditional or integral governmental
function within the scope of National League of Cities."
Some writers have criticized the Supreme Court's failure in
National League of Cities to define clearly the exact nature of
integral and traditional state functions.' The strongest criticism
concerns the frequent use of the word "integral," a term which is
never explained in the opinion." The traditional-integral characteri-
zation had been previously referred to by Justice Rehnquist in
his dissenting opinion in Fry," which was later to become the
foundation for his majority opinion in National League of Cities."
In Fry, Justice Rehnquist recognized the problems that would re-
sult from an attempt to identify the traditional-integral govern-
mental functions and acknowledged that the gray areas which
would develop would require a case-by-case analysis."
By relying heavily on the Supreme Court's reference in National
League of Cities to those activities performed by state and local
governments in furnishing public services, the court in Amersbach
classified the operation of a municipally-owned airport as an inte-
gral governmental function."6 To reach this conclusion, the court
:2d.
3 Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National League
of Cities, 11 GA. L. REV. 35, 66 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Beaird]; Percy,
National League of Cities v. Usery: The Tenth Amendment Is Alive and Doing
Well, 51 TuL. L. REV. 95, 105 (1976).
" Michelman, States' Rights and States' Rules: Permutations of "Sovereignty"
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1172 (1977) [herein-
after cited as Michelman].
62 421 U.S. at 558 n.2.
" Beaird, supra note 63, at 47.
61421 U.S. at 558.
OAmersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979). In
emphasizing the function of public service, the Sixth Circuit appears to have
relied on two leading articles which analyzed the Supreme Court's holding in
National League of Cities v. Usery: Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities:
The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977) and Michelman, supra note 64. 598 F.2d at 1034.
Both writers suggest that if National League of Cities were to be read uncritically
it would appear to be a general vindication of the autonomy of state and
municipal governments to the detriment of the rights of individuals. Yet, due to
the representative nature of Congress and the true political safeguards of fed-
eralism, both writers stated that it would be difficult to argue that the FLSA
amendments meaningfully threatened the states' existence. Therefore, a logical
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found it necessary to analyze the activities characterized in National
League of Cities as being traditional-integral governmental func-
tions." In National League of Cities Justice Rehnquist's list in-
cluded fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health,
parks and recreation."' By examining the common elements of the
protected activities established in National League of Cities, the
court in Amersbach developed a test that would serve as a guide-
line in making this determination.'" The government service or
activity must benefit the community as a whole, be available to
the public at no direct expense, and be undertaken for the purpose
of public service rather than for pecuniary gain.7" The government
must also be the principal provider of the service, and it must be
particularly suited to provide the service due to the public's general
need."3 Applying these elements to the operation of a municipal
airport, which is an indispensable function to a society whose pri-
mary mode of transportation is by air,' the court concluded that
the airport's operation is an integral governmental function.'
Two of the court's requirements leave several questions un-
answered. The first is whether the activity falls out of the protected
class merely because some pecuniary gain is derived in the course
of its operation, or whether it loses protection only when the sole
purpose of the activity becomes one of pecuniary gain. Municipal
airports obtain revenue from leasing runways and terminal space
reading of the decision suggests that the Court was in fact seeking to protect
the existence of the public's right to basic government services. Tribe, supra,
at 1076; Michelman, supra note 64, at 1177.
"' Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1036 (6th Cir. 1979). See
note 34 and accompanying text supra.
70426 U.S. at 851.
'1 598 F.2d at 1037.
72 Id. At least one jurisdiction has held, however, that when the city is ob-
taining substantial revenue from the operation of the airport it becomes a pro-
prietary and not a governmental function. See, e.g., Taylor v. King, 104 Ga.
App. 541, 122 S.E.2d 265, 268 (1961); Southern Airways v. DeKalb, 103 Ga.
App. 69, 118 S.E.2d 234, 239 (1960); Caroway v. Atlanta, 85 Ga. App. 792,
70 S.E.2d 126, 128-29 (1956). Evidently Cleveland's airport was operating at a
profit. Brief for Appellants at 4, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033
(6th Cir. 1979).
"1 598 F.2d at 1037. The court noted that at the time of writing the opinion
there were 475 airports serving the 50 states and U.S. territories. Out of that total,





to private individuals. It is unclear how successful an airport's
operation can be before the activity is considered to be motivated
by profit rather than by public service. The second unanswered
question is, when is the government "particularly suited" to pro-
vide a public service. This phrase is as vague as the traditional-
integral test used by the Court in National League of Cities.
In reaching its conclusion, the court in Amersbach ignores the
requirement that the activity must also be a traditional govern-
mental function; the court merely concludes that the operation of
an airport is an integral governmental function. A reading of the
Court's analysis in National League of Cities suggests that "inte-
gral" and "traditional" have roughly the same meaning."' Twice
the Court uses them together to identify certain governmental
activities: "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions"" and "integral . . . governmental services which states
.. have traditionally afforded their citizens.""' If the lower courts
are to use the terms interchangeably, the definition of "traditional"
comes more readily to mind, whereas "integral" does not as readily
lend itself to any concrete definition.' In Amersbach the court
combined the terms into one phrase,' "traditional-integral govern-
ment functions," yet in the end the emphasis was on the more
nebulous term, "integral," and the word "traditional" seems to
have had little effect upon the court's decision.
The court referred to Justice Rehnquist's recognition in Fry of
the problems that would develop from an attempt to identify tradi-
tional-integral government functions." Rehnquist believed that
courts must determine whether the activity in question is so closely
allied with traditional state functions that Congress could not
constitutionally regulate it." He stated that the traditional distinc-
7
' Michelman, supra note 64, at 1172.
77 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
78 Id. at 851.
" Michelman, supra note 64, at 1172. Throughout the opinion the court
refers to the "traditional-integral" test; it lists activities that National League of
Cities considered to be traditional state functions. Yet, in its concluding state-
ment, it merely states that the operation of a municipal airport is an integral
government function. Id.
60 598 F.2d at 1036.
"Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1036 n.5 (6th Cir. 1979).
62 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 558 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tion between "governmental" and "proprietary" activities, and the
distinction between activities traditionally undertaken by the state
would be helpful in determining whether or not a state activity war-
rants immunity from federal commerce power regulation." One
year later in National League of Cities, Rehnquist referred to
traditional state functions as a bar to federal interference." Thus,
it would be difficult to argue that the word "traditional" was in-
significant in the Supreme Court's final analysis.
Various state jurisdictions have differed over the issue of whether
the operation of a municipal airport has traditionally been a gov-
ernmental or a proprietary function. The issue typically has arisen
in suits alleging a city's negligence in the operation of an airport.
One court noted the futility of attempting to harmonize the deci-
sions, since different courts have reached different conclusions on
the same or similar facts.' Some courts have held that the opera-
tion of a municipal airport is clearly a governmental function
since it is considered the government's response to an obvious
public need."' Others have held it a strictly proprietary function,
for it is not considered an activity which cities have traditionally
"3 Id. at 558 n.2.
-426 U.S. 833 (1976). "[D]isplacement of state decisions may substantially
restrict traditional ways in which local governments have arranged their affairs."
Id. at 840. "[S]ervices . . . which the states have traditionally afforded their
citizens." Id. at 851. "States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions . . ." Id. at 852. The court also reaffirmed
its prior holding in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), in which
it stated that federal interference with the operation of a state-owned railroad
does not violate the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity since the operation
of a railroad is not the type of activity states have traditionally engaged in. 426
U.S. at 854 n.18.
" Wendler v. City of Great Bend, 181 Kan. 753, 759, 316 P.2d 265, 271
(1957).
" Pipes v. Hildebrand, 110 Cal. 2d 645, 243 P.2d 123 (1952) (operation of
municipal airport as public enterprise); Illinois v. Harlingen Wood, 391 Il1. 237, 62
N.E.2d 809 (1945) (no essential difference between operation of public airport and
that of highway, subway, wharf, or public park); Burnham v. Mayor & Alderman
of Beverly, 35 N.E.2d 242 (Mass. 1941) (airport is as essential to aerial navi-
gation as docks to marine navigation, terminals to bus stations, and depots to
trains); Dysart v. St. Louis, 321 Mo. 514, 11 S.W.2d 1045 (1928) (acquisition
and maintenance of airport by city as a public purpose even though no specific
reference to an airport in city's charter); Aviation Serv. v. Board of Adjustment,
20 N.J. 275, 119 A.2d 761 (1956) (airport as a municipal undertaking depends
upon social needs of times); City of Corsicana v. Wren, 159 Tex. 202, 317
S.W.2d 516 (1958) (airport not less of government function because of un-
importance as compared to busier ones in other cities).
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undertaken."' In many of the jurisdictions where the operation of
an airport has been considered to be a public function, the result
turns on the fact that the state legislature had expressly declared
that for matters of public policy the operation should be a gov-
ernmental rather than a proprietary function." Otherwise, without
the express declaration of the state legislature the operation of the
airport would have remained a proprietary function."M In resolving
a federal constitutional issue, the Sixth Circuit clearly would not
have been bound by state court determinations of proprietary and
governmental functions. Considering, however, that the proprietary-
governmental distinction was the plaintiff's primary contention on
appeal" and that in the Amersbach opinion, the Sixth Circuit
noted Justice Rehnquist's observation in Fry concerning the distinc-
tion between proprietary and governmental activities, the question
should have been examined in dealing with the requirement that
the operation of an airport must be a traditional governmental func-
tion. Apparently the court wanted to avoid the anomalous results
that would follow from lower courts attempting to differentiate
between proprietary and governmental functions. Yet by choosing
instead to place more emphasis on the function and service which
the state was providing for the public," the court in Amersbach
never came to grips with the question of whether or not the opera-
tion of an airport is a traditional government function. Instead it
merely stated that both terms, traditional and integral, should be
given meanings that would expand to meet the changing times."
" Wendler v. City of Great Bend, 181 Kan. 753, 316 P.2d 265 (1957)
(operation of airport as essentially corporate in nature); Harrelson v. City of
Fayetteville, 271 N.C. 87, 155 S.E.2d 749 (1967) (operation of airport as public
purpose but serving proprietary function); Ex parte Houston, 93 Okla. Crim.
26, 224 P.2d 281 (1950) (municipal operation of airport clearly proprietary
activity as distinguished from governmental activity, even though owned and
operated airport under the authority of the Uniform Airport Act).
18Kirksey v. City of Fort Smith, 227 Ark. 600, 300 S.W.2d 257 (1957); Baro-
vich v. City of Miles City, 135 Mont. 394, 340 P.2d 819 (1959); Wade v. Salt
Lake City, 10 Utah 2d 374, 353 P.2d 914 (1960).
soThe Ohio legislature has never required a city to operate an airport.
Brief for Appellants at 4, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th
Cir. 1979). Under Ohio law the operation of an airport has been held to be a
proprietary function.9oAmersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1034 (6th Cir. 1979).
"1 Brief for Appellee at 8, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th
Cir. 1979).
92 Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1034 (6th Cir. 1979).
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The Sixth Circuit was correct in the final result reached in
Amersbach. The traditional-integral test which was set forth by
the Supreme Court in National League of Cities is open to numer-
ous interpretations. The Sixth Circuit established some concrete
guidelines for lower courts to follow. Although the guidelines them-
selves will be open to numerous interpretations, they do provide a
starting point in attempting to determine the meaning of integral
governmental function.
The court, however, failed to deal with the traditional functions
of state governments. It would be difficult to deny the important
role traditional functions played in the Supreme Court's final an-
alysis in National League of Cities. Had the court confronted the
problem of distinguishing proprietary and governmental activities,
it could still have reached the same result due to the confusing
status of airports in determining proprietary and governmental
functions.
Amersbach has significantly expanded the scope of National
League of Cities by giving the lower courts concrete guidelines to
follow. The test will require further refinements before courts will
be able to render uniform decisions concerning state sovereignty;
however, after Amersbach the courts will be one step closer to
achieving uniform results than they would have been had the Sixth
Circuit not attempted to give lower courts some guidance in apply-
ing the traditional-integral test.
Connie K. Jobe
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT-UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPE-
TITION-A Fly-Drive Arrangement Between a Carrier and a Rental
Agency Based Upon Advertising Costs Rather Than Upon Dis-
counted Rental Fees Did Not Constitute Unfair Competition, and
Allegations of Illegal Fare Rebates and Passenger Discrimination
Constitute Matters of Public Interest Under Section 411 of the
Federal Aviation Act. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 598 F.2d 250
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
On August 2, 1973, Hawaiian Airlines filed a complaint with
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB or Board) alleging that a 1971
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"fly-drive" agreement between its principal competitor, Aloha Air-
lines, and Budget Rent-A-Car was illegal.' Under the terms of
this agreement, Aloha offered its round-trip passengers a $7.00
per day discount and its one-way passengers a $3.50 per day dis-
count on cars rented from Budget. When passengers exercised
the rental discount option, they paid Aloha its published tariff
rate and Aloha subsequently transferred to Budget the discounted
amount. Although the provisions of the agreement between Aloha
and Budget specified that Aloha's payments to Budget constituted
Aloha's "share of the advertising costs,"' Hawaiian challenged the
agreement, claiming that Aloha was guilty of illegal fare rebating,
unjust discrimination among passengers, and deceptive practices
constituting unfair competition, in violation of sections 403,'
404 (b),' and 411' of the Federal Aviation Act (Act).'
Based on Hawaiian's complaint, the Director of the CAB's
Bureau of Enforcement filed a Petition for Enforcement, indicating
that formal investigation of the matter by the Board would be in
the public interest. Aloha's response to the complaint was to insti-
tute a modified fly-drive arrangement with Budget in 1973. Under
the arrangement Aloha made payments to Budget based on the
cost of advertising the program, not on the number of cars rented
to Aloha passengers. The Administrative Law Judge who presided
at hearings on the petition found that in both the 1971 and 1973
agreements with Budget, Aloha was guilty of illegal fare rebating,
'Scheduled air service within the Hawaiian Islands is provided by two principal
carriers, Hawaiian Airlines and Aloha Airlines, which have virtually identical
route structures and schedule patterns. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Aloha Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 598 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Peti-
tioner]. The two airlines were involved in antitrust litigation during the time of the
instant case which may account for the degree of animosity existing between
them. See Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 489 F.2d 203 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 913 (1974). At the initial hearing, Aloha
attempted to present evidence of Hawaiian's antitrust violations in an effort to
illustrate the nature of their competitive environment and to show that the
Aloha-Budget agreement was necessary to preserve and promote competition.
All of this evidence was stricken by the Administrative Law Judge. Brief for
Petitioner at 30.
2 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 9.
349 U.S.C. § 1373 (Supp. 1977). See text accompanying note 59 infra.
449 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1976). See text accompanying note 80 infra.
549 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976). See text accompanying note 11 infra.
6 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1301
(1976).
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unjust discrimination between passengers, and deceptive practices
which constituted unfair competition." The CAB granted review
and sustained the decision of the judge.' Aloha appealed the CAB
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit." Held, affirmed in part and reversed in part:
A fly-drive arrangement between a carrier and a rental agency based
upon advertising costs rather than upon discounted rental fees did
not constitute unfair competition, and allegations of illegal fare
rebates and passenger discrimination constitute matters of public
interest under section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act. Aloha
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 598 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
On appeal, two separate issues were raised: whether the CAB
properly determined public interest and whether a pro rata pay-
ment between a carrier and a rental agency constituted unfair com-
petition under the Act. Because these issues are fundamentally
different, they are discussed individually.
I. PROPER DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST
The maintenance of high standards in dealing with the public
has long been established as a duty of common carriers."0 The
CAB, under a congressional mandate, is charged with the protec-
tion of the public interest as affected by the practices of air carriers,
as stated in section 411 of the Act:
The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint by
any air carrier.... if it considers that such action by it would
be in the interest of the public, investigate and determine whether
any air carrier . . . has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive
practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation
or the sale thereof.11
'These hearings were held in May 1975, before Administrative Law Judge
Greer M. Murphy, who issued his decision on September 17, 1975. On October
10, 1975, Aloha filed a petition with the Board for discretionary review of
Judge Murphy's decision. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 9.
1 By CAB Order No. 76-10-88 (Oct. 20, 1976), the Board granted review
and without further proceedings sustained Judge Murphy's decision. Id. at 7.
"The court's jurisdiction over this review action arises under 49 U.S.C. 5
1486(a) (1976). Venue in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit is provided under 49 U.S.C. § 1486(b) (1976).
"
0American Airlines, Inc. v. North Am. Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 84 (1956).
1149 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976).
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Through the provisions of section 411, Congress committed to the
CAB broad discretion to determine the standards for investigation
of complaints and the circumstances which constitute "public
interest."'"
The parentage of section 411, which gives the CAB jurisdiction
over allegations of unfair competition when in the public interest,
is well established. In 1956, the United States Supreme Court in
American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc." noted
that section 411 was patterned after section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTCA),', which similarly prohibits unfair meth-
ods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive practices."
The Court stated that judicial interpretations of section 5 may be
used to clarify the resolution of questions concerning section 411 ."
Like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the CAB is em-
powered to issue complaints and initiate investigations if it deter-
mines that to do so is in the best interest of the public." A finding
of public interest is not a prerequisite to the issuance of a cease and
desist order under either section 411 or section 5,18 but public
1 2 REA Express, Inc. v. CAB, 507 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally
Transcontinental Bus Sys., Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466, 478 (5th Cir. 1967);
Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. CAB, 350 F.2d 462, 465 (4th Cir. 1965). Factors to
be considered by the Board in determining public interest are set forth in 49
U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1976). These factors include the maintenance of safety,
availability of services by air carriers, reliance on competitive market forces,
maintenance of a regulatory environment, use of satellite airports, and the pre-
vention of unfair practices in air transportation. The Supreme Court has held
that "convenience of the traveling public, speed and efficiency in air transport,
and protection of reliance on a carrier's equipment are all criteria which the
Board may properly consider in determining whether the public interest justifies
use of its powers under § 411." American Airlines, Inc. v. North Am. Airlines,
Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 85 (1956).
351 U.S. 79 (1956).
14 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1976).
1 351 U.S. at 82.
10Id.
"Id. See text accompanying note 11 supra. It is noteworthy that the thres-
hold public interest limitation was not contained in the original bill introducing
the Federal Trade Commission Act, but was added subsequently during con-
ference. H.R. 15613, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). Legislative history shows that
Congress was concerned that the Commission would become involved in the
settlement of disputes between competitors which should be adjudicated in the
courts. 51 CONG. REC. 14930 (1914). For a detailed explanation of the de-
velopment of section 5, see 2 H. TOULMIN, JR., A TREAiSE ON THE ANTI-TRuST
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES S 39.5 (1949).
18American Airlines, Inc. v. North Am. Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 83 (1956).
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interest is an essential condition to the Board's assumption of
jurisdiction under section 411 to initiate investigations of allegedly
unfair methods of competition."
The Supreme Court considered the proper standard for the
filing of an FTC complaint under section 5 of the FTCA in FTC
v. Klesner." Justice Brandeis' majority opinion stated that for
such a complaint to be filed, the public interest must be "specific
and substantial."'" Thus, the inherent public interest in the preser-
vation of private rights is insufficient to support a finding of public
interest." The Brandeis opinion also established that the courts
alone adjudicate private legal rights concerning competition, pro-
hibiting such adjudication of private rights through administrative
agencies." Adopting the "specific and substantial" standard for
determination of public interest set forth in Klesner,' the Court
in American Airlines observed that, while the discretion of the
CAB is subject to judicial review, the courts do not independently
determine what constitutes matters of public interest.' The Court
further clarified the Klesner holding as applied to section 411 by
emphasizing that the thrust of that section is to protect public
interest, not to protect competitors or punish unfair practices."
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States,' the
Supreme Court altered its position in American Airlines by stating
that the power of the Board under section 411 could be used
not only to protect the public interest, but also to strengthen anti-
See 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976), which provides in pertinent part: "[If the Board
shall find ...unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition,
it shall order such air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent to cease and
desist from such practices or methods of competition."
" American Airlines, Inc. v. North Am. Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 83 (1956).
20280 U.S. 19 (1929).
21 id. at 28.
2Id.
23 Id. at 25-30. See also Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 296, 306 (1963).
24 See FTC v. Keppel, 291 U.S. 304 (1934); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288
U.S. 212 (1933).
2American Airlines, Inc. v. North Am. Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 85 (1956).
Although the Board did not expressly state its finding of public interest it did
set forth numerous factual and legal considerations which it concluded required
a hearing for proper resolution. CAB Order E-7107 at 7 (Jan. 28, 1953).
"Id. See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929).
27371 U.S. 296 (1963).
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trust enforcement." The Court based its reasoning on the legisla-
tive history of the CAB's creation which indicates the broad
jurisdictional power over air transportation which Congress in-
tended the Board to possess."0 The Court specified that the pre-
cise scope of "unfair practices" and "unfair methods of competi-
tion" would be determined on a case-by-case basis. 1
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals defined the scope
of authority of the CAB's Director of the Bureau of Enforcement
in Flight Engineers' International Association v. CAB.2 The Direc-
tor found that a complaint contained sufficient grounds to sug-
gest that provisions of the Act had been violated.' Because it
appeared to be in the interest of the public for the Board to insti-
gate formal investigation, the Director filed a petition for enforce-
ment and docketed the complaint for a hearing.' The Board
granted a motion to dismiss the action, concluding that it was not
in the public interest to hold a lengthy hearing concerning private
rights which adequately and appropriately could be held in the
courts.'
The court held that the CAB has discretionary power to dismiss
a complaint which alleges violations of the Act if it reasonably
determines that to do so is' in the public interest.' Observing that
2"Id. at 304. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated that under
section 411, Board proceedings should be based not upon antitrust laws but
upon the public interest standard of the Board's overall mandate. Id. at 320.
2 "It is the purpose of this legislation to coordinate in a single independent
agency all of the existing functions of the Federal Government with respect
to civil aeronautics, and, in addition, to authorize the new agency to perform
certain new regulatory functions which are designed to stabilize the air trans-
portation industry in the United States." H.R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1938).
"Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1963).
"Id. at 306.
332 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The petitioner in this case, Flight Engi-
neers' International Association, EAL Chapter, filed a complaint with the CAB
alleging that Eastern Airlines had violated certain labor provisions under section
401 of the Act.
3Id. at 313.
34 Id.
"Id. at 313-14. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
"Id. at 314. The petitioner argued unsuccessfully that the Civil Aeronautics
Act, predecessor of the Federal Aviation Act, was modeled after the Interstate
Commerce Act, under section 13 of which the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion is required to hold a hearing upon the filing of a complaint that is not
satisfied by the carrier against whom the complaint is filed. The court sustained
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the CAB's discretion is subject to review,"7 the court reasoned that
denial of this discretionary power would greatly hinder the CAB
in settling disputes and protecting the public interest in undisrupted
air transportation." Because the Board is not bound by the Direc-
tor's determinations, the court concluded that the CAB had not
delegated to the Director the final authority to determine whether
a complaint should proceed to a hearing."
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in REA Express, Inc. v.
CAB,"' attempted to clarify both the appropriate standard for
judicial review of Board decisions and the application of the "spe-
cific and substantial" standard for determination of public interest
under section 411. The court held that the function of a reviewing
court is limited to ensuring that the Board has not abused its discre-
tion."1 Under this narrow scope of review, a decision by the Board
should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole." In this, case the CAB held that the complainant
failed to establish a prima facie claim for injunctive relief because
the facts it alleged were insufficient to meet the "rigorous" specific
and substantial standard. ' Yet the court applied this standard to
determine public injury and not public interest." Observing the
necessity of maintaining the public-private distinction under sec-
tion 411, the court stated that the Board could assume jurisdiction
the power of the CAB to exercise wide discretion in dismissal of complaints if
such dismissal is based upon reasonable grounds, relying upon Nebraska Dep't
of Aeronautics v. CAB, 298 F.2d 286, 295 (8th Cir. 1962). Id. See Pan American-
Grace Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 178 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1949); 1 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE S 4.07, at 259-60 (1958).
3749 U.S.C. 5 1486 (1976). See Trailways of New Eng., Inc. v. CAB, 412
F.2d 926, 931 (1st Cir. 1969).
" Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n v. CAB, 332 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
'Id. See 14 C.F.R. § 304.204 (1978).
40 507 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1974).41 Id. at 45. See Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 178 F.2d 34, 36
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
4REA Express, Inc. v. CAB, 507 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1974). See American
Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); American Airlines v. CAB,
231 F.2d 483, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
'REA Express, Inc. v. CAB, 507 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1974). In the case,
REA's complaint alleged that utilization of the words "Air Express" in the cor-
porate titles of its competitors was inherently likely to cause public confusion.
Id. at 44.
4 Id. at 46.
1980] CASENOTES
under section 411 only where injury to the public is substantial."
The application of section 411 by the Second Circuit in REA
Express was clarified by the Supreme Court in Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc." The Court stated that the Board is not required
to find that a carrier's practices caused injury or were intentionally
deceptive in order for the Board to assume jurisdiction in the
matter."' Omitting mention of the threshold "specific and sub-
stantial" standard of public interest under section 411," Justice
Powell's opinion declared that the Board's assumption of juris-
diction to initiate investigation under section 411 is premised on
a finding that public interest is involved."
In the midst of this confusion over application of the public
interest standard under section 411, the court in Aloha Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB"0 dismissed petitioner's argument that allegations in
the complaint did not support a finding of public interest." Writ-
ing for the court, Judge Robb held that the CAB may delegate
authority to the Director of the Bureau of Enforcement to make
a finding of public interest." Citing the narrow standard of judicial
review of Board decisions under the Second Circuit REA Express
5Id.
-426 U.S. 290 (1976). The petitioner in this case brought both a common
law fraud action against Allegheny based upon its failure to apprise petitioner
of its deliberate overbooking practices and a statutory action under section 404(b)
of the Act, arising from Allegheny's failure to provide petitioner the boarding
priority specified in its rules filed with the CAB. For a detailed discussion of
this case see Tice, Overbooking of Airline Reservations in View of "Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc.": The Opening of Pandora's Box, 43 J. AIR L. & CoM.
1 (1977).
411d. at 302. See American Airlines, Inc. v. North Am. Airlines, Inc., 351
U.S. 79, 86 (1955).
" Justice Powell's majority opinion states, "Section 411 is purely restrictive.
It contemplates the elimination of 'unfair or deceptive' practices that impair the
public interest." Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 301 (1976).
I Id. at 302. The majority opinion also states that the Board is not empowered
to vindicate private rights; thus individual consumers have no standing under sec-
tion 411 proceedings. Id.
10 598 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
"
1 Id. at 256.
521d. See 14 C.F.R. § 385.22 (1978); 14 C.F.R. § 302.206 (1978). Aloha
contended that because section 385.22 contains no delegation of power to make
the requisite public interest finding under section 411, the Director did not
possess the power to make such a finding. The court noted that section 385 is
not the exclusive source of power delegation by the Board and found that
section 302.206 empowers the Director to make such a finding.
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decision,"3 Judge Robb observed that the courts do not independ-
ently determine what constitutes public interest due to the broad
discretionary power of the Board to make such judgments."
Responding to petitioner's argument that there was no evidence
of a threshold finding of public interest by the Board," Judge
Robb concluded that the complaint alleged fare rebates in viola-
tion of section 403" and passenger discrimination in violation of
section 404(b)" ' of the Act, constituting "obvious" questions of
public interest."
II. LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARRIER PROMOTIONAL PROGRAMS
A. Fare Rebates
Under section 403 (b) ( 1 ) of the Act, 9 air carriers are required
to charge and receive no more and no less than the rates set out in
their current tariffs. This section specifically prohibits the refund
or remittance of any portion of the particular rates by any carrier,
ticket agent, or broker "in any manner or by any device, directly
or indirectly . . ."" except those specified within the section.1
The provisions of section 403 came directly from the Interstate
Commerce Act (ICA) " so that decisions interpreting that Act
are "the best guide lines available" for the resolution of cases under
section 403. " Decisions rendered under the ICA have long pro-
hibited the provision of additional services to shippers or pas-
sengers at low cost rates.' Thus, when services unnecessary for
I See text accompanying note 41 supra.
'Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 598 F.2d 250, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Id.
See text accompanying note 59 infra.
SSee text accompanying note 80 infra.
5 8Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 598 F.2d 250, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
949 U.S.C. § 1373(b)(1) (Supp. 1977).
60 Id.
81 Id. Exceptions include employees and their families, survivors of employees
killed in aircraft accidents, persons injured in aircraft accidents, ministers, elderly
persons and handicapped persons.
"See 49 U.S.C. § 6 (1976).
"Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 662, 666 (1st Cir. 1965).
"In Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished that "the purchase of a transportation ticket by a passenger and its sale
by the company, shall be consummated only by the former paying cash and by
the latter receiving cash of the amount specified in the published tariffs." 219
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transportation are furnished below cost, the ICA is violated."
In the instant case both the Administrative Law Judge and
the CAB held the 1971 Aloha-Budget agreement illegal on the
grounds that Aloha's subsidization of rental car fees constituted
fare rebates to Aloha passengers."" The court of appeals affirmed
this holding noting that Aloha's payments to Budget amounted to
a predetermined assessment based on the number of cars rented."'
Aloha argued that these payments constituted a legitimate sharing
of joint costs incurred in the program."' Observing that the pay-
ments were not related to advertising costs, " the court found that
the actual advertising expenses were dramatically lower than
Aloha's payments0 and that Aloha had deliberately disguised its
payments to Budget in an effort to mislead the Board.' The court
concluded that Aloha's payments to Budget allowed Aloha pas-
sengers to rent cars from Budget at a subsidized lower rate, thus
U.S. 467, 477 (1923). Application of this holding in regard to restrictions on
subsidized services by carriers was clarified by the Supreme Court in Baltimore
& O.R.R. v. United States, where the Court stated, "When services, not necessary
for transportation, are furnished below cost in an effort to acquire rail trans-
portation [the ICA] is violated." 305 U.S. 507 (1939). See also Union Pacific
R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941).
61 Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 305 U.S. 507, 524 (1939).
6 Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 598 F.2d 250, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The
rationale of this holding was that while an Aloha passenger initially paid the pub-
lished air fare, he later received a partial refund through a reduced car rental
fee. Id.
67Id.
00 Id. at 259. Aloha argued that the Administrative Law Judge and the CAB
entirely excluded from their computation of shared costs such items as Budget's
extensive mailings to travel institutions, payment of sales incentives to employees
of Budget and Aloha, special commissions to travel agents, travel by Budget
representatives to the mainland to promote the program, and the cost of printed
ads. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 36. The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, however, affirmed the holding of the Administrative Law Judge
and the Board that Aloha could not justify its payments as an offset to increased
expenses incurred by Budget in renting cars at discount rates. Aloha Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 598 F.2d 250, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
"' The court found from the record that the Aloha payments related in a
clear and identifiable manner to the discounts which Budget offered to Aloha's
fly-drive passengers. 598 F.2d at 258.
70 During the two years that the 1971 agreement was operative, Budget's
actual advertising expenses were less than $360,000, while Aloha's payments to
Budget were more than $1,350,000. Id. at 259.
71 The court determined that Aloha had disguised its payments to Budget
through indirect billings and reports and a false copy of the fly-drive agreement.
Id.
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constituting a fare rebate in violation of section 403." Responding
to Aloha's contention that its payments to Budget could not be
distinguished from other carriers' promotional devices such as the
provision of meals, drinks, credit cards and movies,"3 the court
held that the provision of such services does not violate section 403
because these services are supplied by the airlines in direct con-
nection with air transportation alone and the services are supplied
in compliance with filed tariffs.'
The CAB sustained the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge, who held that the 1973 agreement, like the 1971 agreement,
was unlawful because the rebate formed an aggregate payment
to Budget through the absorption of all advertising costs.' The
court of appeals reversed, noting that critical differences existed
between the 1971 and the 1973 agreements." In support of this
decision, the court simply pointed out that the Board failed to
distinguish properly the 1973 Aloha-Budget program from a simi-
lar agreement between Hawaiian Airlines and Hertz Corporation,
approved by the Board, under which Hawaiian paid for "only its
fair share" of the advertising costs." Although Aloha in the 1973
agreement paid for the entire advertising cost of the fly-drive pro-
gram, the court found no evidence to indicate that this payment
was disproportionate to the benefits received by Aloha or that
Aloha refunded fares to its passengers through subsidization of the
car rental service."
B. Passenger Discrimination
Congressional policy concerning transportation requires that
persons who obtain transportation in interstate commerce should
72 Id.
73 Id.
"I Id. See Passenger Credit Plans Investigation, 37 C.A.B. 404, 406-07, 412
(1963); Ground Transportation Between Airports, 31 C.A.B. 5 (1960).
Is Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 598 F.2d 250, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The
Board affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge without considering
the structure or the 1973 arrangement by concluding that "the form of the pay-
ments to Budget was altered; everything else remained the same." Id.
r1 id. The most significant difference between the 1971 and 1973 Aloha-
Budget agreements is that under the 1973 agreement, Aloha made no payments
to Budget based on the number of cars rented to Aloha passengers, nor did




be "treated absolutely alike and that all should be on a plane of
equality."" Section 404(b) of the Act provides that "[n]o air car-
rier . . . shall ... subject any particular person. . . to any unjust
discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or dis-
advantage in any respect whatsoever."" ° An early CAB decision '
held that a promotional arrangement under which passengers were
forced to buy an accommodation package in order to be eligible
for a reduced fare was unjustly discriminatory." Subsequent Board
decisions have determined that such factors as "stimulation of
overall traffic levels,"8 encouragement of development and compe-
tition," and differences in types of service" and reservations8 '
justify discrimination in fares." Section 404(b) is violated when
different fares or rates are charged for similar services under sub-
stantially similar conditions."' Unequal fares thus are not unlawful
per se and may be allowed if properly justified.
The court found that no justification existed to validate the 1971
Aloha-Budget agreement, which it found to be simply a method
by which Aloha refunded fares to passengers."' Because passengers
who exercised the option to rent cars paid less for the same service
than passengers who did not, the court concluded that different
fares were charged." The court distinguished this arrangement
from "legitimate" ones in which passengers pay the same fares but
choose not to participate in certain air transportation services
available to all and set forth under filed tariffs." Since it found no
justification for this discrimination, the court affirmed the finding
of the Administrative Law Judge and the CAB that the 1971
"'Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 662, 666 (1st Cir. 1965).
8049 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1976).
"Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257 (1951).
nId.
83 Group Inclusive Tour-Basing Fares to Hawaii, 54 C.A.B. 534 (1970).
"United Air Lines, Inc., CAB Order No. 77-12-24 (Dec. 2, 1977).
"See United Custom Coach, Suspension and Investigation, 26 C.A.B. 23,
24 (1957).
"Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 455 F.2d 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'7 598 F.2d at 262-63.
88Id.
"Id.
90 Id. at 263.
"1Id.
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agreement violated section 404(b) of the Act by unjustly dis-
criminating among passengers."
The court found no payments or practices under the modified
1973 Aloha-Budget agreement which constituted a fare rebate in
violation of section 403." Without a finding of rebates or dis-
crimination in fares charged by Aloha, the court observed that
it "logically follows" that there was no discrimination among pas-
sengers in violation of section 404(b)." Finding no violation of
sections 403 or 404(b), the court concluded that the 1973 agree-
ment did not constitute an unfair practice in violation of section
411 of the Act, and reversed the decision of the Board."
III. CONCLUSION
All carriers conduct business under a regulated system of limited
competition which is of special concern to the public as is true of
all common carriers and public utilities." Congress has committed
the regulation of air transportation to the CAB, in an effort to
devote the Board's special competence to the aviation industry."
This decision significantly modifies the standard for determination
of public interest in matters concerning unfair practices and com-
petition under section 411 of the Act. The court failed to heed
the specific language of the Supreme Court in American Airlines,"
that section 411 is concerned exclusively with protecting the public
interest, not with protecting injured competitors or with punishing
wrongdoers." Use of a "dual function" approach to section 411
as in Pan American" still requires a finding of public interest
upon which to base CAB jurisdiction."' Even under the recent
liberal construction of section 411 in Nader,"2 public "involvement"
92Id.
"See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
94 598 F.2d at 264.
9" Id.
"American Airlines, Inc. v. North Am. Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 85 (1956).
97Id.
"1 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
"See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
1"'See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
101 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
112 See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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is established as an essential element for the Board's assumption
of jurisdiction and the use of section 411 is characterized as "re-
strictive" and limited to situations where the public interest has
been "impaired."
1 0
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals construed Aloha
Airlines' alleged violations of sections 403 and 404(b) of the
Act as matters of obvious public interest constituting per se viola-
tions of section 411. By broadening the scope of public interest
to include that which is deemed "obvious," this decision expands
jurisdiction of the CAB to an unnecessary and potentially hazard-
ous scope." ' It has long been held that the courts, not the CAB,
are the appropriate arenas for the vindication of private rights
concerning unfair practices and competition, so that a complaint
must allege a matter which concerns public interest to provide a
jurisdictional base for the Board. The creation of the "obvious"
standard for determination of public interest appears, wholly in-
adequate, providing the CAB with jurisdiction in matters where
it "obviously" does not belong.
The opinion of the court is of further significance in setting out
qualifications which carriers must meet when participating in joint
venture promotional arrangements. In this decision the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals establishes a two-tiered test to deter-
mine the legality of promotional efforts of a carrier in a joint busi-
ness venture. Such an arrangement must first avoid a pro rata
payment basis under which the carrier's payments create an illegal
rebate by subsidization of a tangential service in violation of sec-
tion 403 of the Act. Although congressional policy concerning
transportation promotes equal treatment of passengers, the Act
prohibits only that discrimination which is deemed unjust. This
" See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
104 The implications of this holding will be greatly affected by the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (amending
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976)), a topic beyond the scope of this note. For
discussion of the Deregulation Act, see Cohen, New Air Service and Deregulation:
A Study in Transition, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 695 (1979); Kelleher, Deregulation
and the Practicing Attorney, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 261 (1978); Comment, "De-
regulation"-Has it Finally Arrived? The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
44 J. AIR L. & COM. 799 (1979). This expansion of CAB jurisdiction is particu-
larly noteworthy in view of the provisions set forth under 49 U.S.C. §
1551(a)(2)(A), (B) (Supp. 1979), that the authority of the Board concerning
section 403 and section 404 of the Act will expire on January 1, 1983.
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decision establishes that pro rata promotional payments constitute
illegal rebates and create unjust discrimination among passengers
in violation of section 404(b) of the Act. The court seems to
impose as a second standard a test of whether the payment by
the carrier is proportional to the benefits it receives. Although the
existence of an actual refund of fares to a carrier's passengers is
undoubtedly the chief criterion for determining the legality of a
joint promotional effort, this additional "proportionality" standard
could have a significant effect on such programs. It is foreseeable
that a carrier's joint venture might fully comply with the pro rata
res, rrctons yet not meet the "proportionality" standard. The diffi-
culties inherent in determining what constitutes a proper propor-
tion are implicit at every stage of a joint venture.
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 encourages competition
among the airlines." Spiraling fuel costs and operational expenses
will undoubtedly force the airlines to frequently increase ticket
prices, at least in the foreseeable future. ' " As the degree of compe-
tition for passengers becomes more keen, the value of amenities,
gratuitous services, and promotional bonuses for passengers will
increase. While the pro rata payment basis provides a relatively
clear standard for determining the legality of these programs, the
"proportionality" standard leaves the airlines and their joint ven-
turers without sufficient guidelines to meet the economic demands
of the future.
Lucy Johnson
10 See 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (4) (Supp. 1977) which states that the CAB is
to place reliance on competitive market forces and on actual and potential com-
petition "to provide the needed air transportation system, and to . . . encourage
efficient and well-managed carriers to earn adequate profits and to attract capital."
10 United States airlines spent an estimated $2 billion more for fuel in 1979
than in 1978. Without the benefit of frequent fare increases to accommodate
higher operational costs, it is doubtful if the airline industry could maintain its
operations. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 13, 1979, at 20.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE-PENDENT AND ANCILLARY JURISDIC-
TION-In an Action Based Upon a Federal Question, a District
Court May Assert Pendent Jurisdiction Over a Plaintiff's Claim
Against a Third-Party Defendant Even Though an Independent
Basis for that Jurisdiction is Absent. Ortiz v. United States, 595
F.2d 65 (lst Cir. 1979).
On January 21, 1973, a Puerto Rican veteran visited the United
States Veteran's Hospital in San Juan. Rather than attending to
him, the employees of that institution referred him to the local
Mimaya Hospital, Inc. (Mimaya), a private facility, for hospitali-
zation. At Mimaya, he allegedly received improper treatment which
caused his health to decline rapidly and which led to his death
little more than a year later.
This veteran's family brought suit in 1975 against the United
States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act,' alleging that the
failure of the employees of the Veteran's Hospital to diagnose the
decedent's serious condition constituted negligence. This negligence
resulted in severe injury to the decedent and contributed to his
death. The referral of the decedent to Mimaya by the employees
of the Veteran's Hospital was also alleged to be an express authori-
zation for hospitalization under the auspices of the federal govern-
ment, so that the government would face additional liability for
any negligent actions by employees at Mimaya. This construction
of the case prompted the government to file a third-party com-
plaint against Mimaya seeking indemnification for any potential
liability.!
'28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) provides that:
mhe district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions or claims against the United States, for money damages....
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred.
The Federal Tort Claims Act waived the sovereign immunity of the federal
government for tortious acts of its officers and employees by expressly granting
consent to be sued. The judicial interpretation of that consent has come to
include only proprietary or governmental functions. Discretionary duties are
excluded from possible liability. 35 AM. JuR. 2d Federal Tort Claims Act 55
15-18 (1967).
2FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Under this rule, ancillary jurisdiction over the
1980]
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A year after the third-party complaint was filed, the plaintiffs
moved for leave to amend their original complaint to add a non-
federal negligence claim3 directly against Mimaya. Because both
parties were citizens of Puerto Rico, the district court denied both
the motion to amend and a later motion for reconsideration but
granted permission to the plaintiffs to appeal its ruling." Held: Re-
versed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the
court's opinion: In an action based upon a federal question, a
district court may assert pendent jurisdiction over a plaintiff's
claim against a third-party defendant even though an independent
basis for that jurisdiction is absent. Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d
65 (lst Cir. 1979).
PENDENT JURISDICTION-PRECEDENT FOR ITS EXPANSION
The federal judiciary is granted power over a narrow variety of
third-party claim has been found so that the court will not be impeded by any
procedural barriers should the claim arise from the same set of facts. See
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.
1970); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959). In the instant case, an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction also existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1345
(1976), which provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress,
the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or pro-
ceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof
expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress."
' The term "nonfederal claim" means one for which there is no independent
basis for federal jurisdiction. Conversely, a federal claim means one for which
an independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists. Owen Equip. & Erection Co.
v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n.11 (1978).
428 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) provides that:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion
that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ulti-
mate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in
such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion,
permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made
to it within ten days after the entry of the order; Provided, how-
ever, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay pro-
ceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court
of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
Normally, the plaintiff's appeal would have been postponed until the conclu-
sion of the litigation. Recognizing the uncertain state of the law in the field,
particularly the most recent Supreme Court opinions, and aware that a decision
in Kroger, cited in note 3 supra, was imminent and might affect its ruling, the
district court certified the interlocutory appeal. It was accepted by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals and was stayed until the opinion in Kroger was handed down
and duly considered.
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cases and controversies by the United States Constitution,' and the
actual contours of that power have long been the subject of judicial
scrutiny and analysis. Much of that effort has been devoted to
defining the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction and
interpreting the effects of those doctrines upon the courts. Ancillary
jurisdiction is technically held to arise only when a federal court
effectively controls the property or fund under dispute so that other
claimants should be allowed to intervene to protect their interests
without regard to the normal requisites of jurisdiction.' The appli-
cation of true ancillary jurisdiction should be limited to appropriate
factual situations, while the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction should
be invoked when related federal and nonfederal claims derive from
a common nucleus of fact so that both may be adjudicated in one
proceeding.' The nonfederal claim may be either a true pendent
claim, involving the same parties, or it may be a pendent party
claim, where a party outside the original litigants in the case is
sought to be added because of some claim against him which arose
from the same facts.' The courts in recent years have attempted
'The federal courts, under U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, are granted power
over a variety of cases and controversies:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; -to
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;
-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be a party; -to Contro-
versies-between two or more States; -between a State and Citizens
of another State; -between Citizens of different States; between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of differ-
ent States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 456 (1860).
' Over the years, the technical distinctions between ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction have become blurred, so that the terms are used interchangeably.
This led the Supreme Court to conclude that, whatever the true distinctions,
there are no "principled" differences between the two concepts and that they
are to be treated in the same manner. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13
(1976). Courts still continue to discuss them separately, however, and draw
some distinctions.
' The subtle distinction between a pendent claim and a pendent party has
proven confusing and has led to erroneous court decisions. The issue is not
the personal jurisdiction of the court over the party who is being added to the
case, but the subject matter jurisdiction over the claim which is being asserted
against the defendant. Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction-The Problem of "Pendent-
ing Parties," 34 U. P=rr. L. REV. 1, 5, 12 (1972).
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to refine and clarify this jurisdictional maelstrom, and Ortiz occu-
pies a significant position in this judicial endeavor.
Yet the accepted view of the courts' power has not always en-
compassed the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. For
a time the judiciary did not recognize their existence. They are
the products of a slow but steady progression of precedent which
has continually broadened the scope of federal jurisdiction from
its infancy when the mere presence of a nonfederal question in a
case was argued to prevent the exercise of the federal courts'
power.' That contention was soundly rejected by Chief Justice
Marshall in 1824,"0 and his reasoning was later applied by the
Court to permit a federal court to decide every question in a case
regardless of the grounds for the ultimate decision of the action."
Other Supreme Court decisions over the decades held that a de-
fendant's nonfederal compulsory counterclaim could be heard even
though the plaintiff's claim had been dismissed" and that a non-
9 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 6 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 251, 256 (1824).
The Bank of the United States sued in federal circuit court under an authoriza-
tion of jurisdiction found in its charter permitting such action. The suit was to
enjoin collection of an allegedly unconstitutional state tax. Questions of state law
involving the party liable to pay the award of the court, the levying of interest
on that award and the validity of injunctive relief in the action were also present.
The appellants in the case argued that under the controlling precedent the pres-
ence of those state questions would preclude the federal court's assumption of
jurisdiction. Chief Justice Marshall realized the overwhelming practical ramifi-
cations of such an argument, as "[i]f this were sufficient ...almost every case
• . . would be withdrawn," and reversed the earlier decisions, holding that
"when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the
constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of
congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other
questions of fact or of law may be involved in it." Id.
10 See note 9 supra.
1 Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). A state order
regulating rates was attacked as unauthorized by state law and as unconstitutional
under federal law. The presence of a substantial federal question "gave the circuit
court jurisdiction, and, having properly obtained it, that court had the right to
decide all the questions in the case, even though it decided the Federal questions
adversely to the party raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them at all,
but decided the case on local or state questions only." 213 U.S. at 191. The
state regulation was held invalid on state grounds and a determination of the
federal questions was never reached. But see Cleveland Eng'r Co. v. Galion Dy-
namic Motor Truck Co., 243 F. 405 (N.D. Ohio 1917).
12 Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926). The Court, present-
ing little concrete reasoning, retained jurisdiction over the defendant's compulsory
counterclaim under Equity Rule 30 although the plaintiff's allegations of Sherman
Act violations were dismissed on the merits. The close connection between the
two complaints, making the decision of one tantamount to decision of the other,
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federal claim could be adjudicated distinct and separate from its
federal companion if each constituted only one ground of the same
"cause of action"'3 arising from the same factual situation." It had
taken more than a century to achieve even this limited expansion of
the boundaries of federal jurisdiction, and another thirty-three
years elapsed before the Supreme Court ushered in the modem
view of federal jurisdiction with its decision in United Mine Work-
ers v. Gibbs."
Gibbs abandoned the "unnecessarily grudging"" approach to-
ward parallel claims exhibited by its predecessors. Both a federal
statutory claim and a claim under the common law of Tennessee
were asserted against the United Mine Workers by the plaintiff."
Although diversity between the parties was lacking, the Court sus-
tained the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the nonfederal claim
even after the anchor claim'8 was dismissed. Reliance on the out-
dated single cause of action theory of earlier cases,1' which would
have prevented the court's full disposition of the action, was dis-
carded in favor of a more flexible treatment of the jurisdictional
question.
dictated the decision's outcome. The failure of relief if only a portion of the
case were decided was also cited as a ground for the decision. 270 U.S. at 610.
"Under the Equity Rules, the predecessor of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the phrase "cause of action" was used to signify all of the claims
arising from one factual basis. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321
(1927).
1'4 Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). This decision represented the secure
position which the expansion of federal jurisdiction had won in the courts. A
federal statutory claim for copyright infringement was coupled with a claim of
unfair competition under state law. No copyright infringement was found, but
the Court retained the unfair competition claim despite its lack of jurisdiction
by applying the Siler rule, cited in note 11 supra. The reliance in Hum on the
elusive concept of a "cause of action" led to confusion and inconsistent appli-
cation of the test by the lower courts, and with the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1948 the decision lost much of its relevance.
"5383 U.S. 715 (1966).
"I Id. at 725.
" The claims arose from the alleged concerted efforts of the union to deny
the plaintiff his employment in a local coal mine, depriving him of his contractual
relationship with the owners of the mine. Id. at 720.
" The term "anchor claim" is used to describe the federal claim, either a
federal question or a diversity situation, which forms the basis for the action.
The nonfederal claim is attached to this anchor and brought under the juris-
diction of the court. The anchor claim in Gibbs was based upon a violation of
section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 187 (1976).
" See notes 13 and 14 supra.
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In formulating this flexible approach, the Justices in Gibbs
initially addressed the constitutional issues involved in expanding
jurisdiction. The Court held that pendent jurisdiction, in the sense
of judicial power, could be asserted if two tests were satisfied: (1)
the anchor claim must meet the constitutional standards of article
II and (2) the federal and nonfederal claims must arise from a
common nucleus of operative fact so that the action would consti-
tute one case2' which would ordinarily be adjudicated in a single
proceeding." If both of these criteria were met, the constitutional
power to hear both claims would exist.
The Court, having reached a decision on the constitutional issue,
enumerated three factors traditionally considered in deciding ques-
tions of efficient judicial administration: judicial economy, con-
venience to the litigants, and fairness. Each of these considerations
would have a direct bearing upon any decision to exercise the
constitutional jurisdictional power. Pendent jurisdiction was not
to be a doctrine every plaintiff could claim by right but was to be
a doctrine of discretion," carefully and cautiously applied by the
courts.
20 See note 5 supra.
21 The semantic distinction between case and controversy originally found in
article III has been the focus of attention for several courts. The classic definition
of the distinction, propounded by Justice Field in In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32
F. 241 (N.D. Cal. 1887) and later endorsed by the Supreme Court in Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), holds that a controversy is narrower
than a case and should include only suits of a civil nature. 32 F. at 255; 300
U.S. at 239. The court in Ortiz devoted considerable thought to the proposition
that an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act is only a controversy and
that the Gibbs standard, phrased in terms of cases, might be inapplicable. It
reached the opposite conclusion, however, since any academic distinction that
may exist has had no effect upon the permissible scope of pendent jurisdiction
and has been used solely in the evolution of the doctrine of justiciability. 13
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE S 3529
(1975).
2 383 U.S. at 725. Some commentators, analyzing the language of the Court
in strict grammatical fashion, have argued that there are three requirements
established for the test of constitutional judicial power. The first, dealing with
a substantive federal anchor claim, is of general application, while the latter
two, based upon a common nucleus of operative fact and the ordinary dis-
position of the case in one proceeding, are alternative applications, only one
of which must be met for this requirement to be fulfilled. Baker, Toward a
Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. PITT. L. REv.
759, 764 (1972).
23 383 U.S. at 726. Additional factors which might affect the court's exercise
of its discretionary power over pendent jurisdiction have been suggested. Among
these is a consideration of federalism, so that the dominion of the state courts
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The lower courts were quick to accept the constitutional standard
of Gibbs and rushed to assert jurisdiction over an assortment of
parallel claims by utilizing this procedural device.' Over the next
several years, however, the Supreme Court continued to wrestle
with the nuances of the question of broadened federal jurisdiction,
uncertain of what sort of creature they had wrought. The elusive
distinctions between ancillary and pendent jurisdiction and be-
tween pendent claims and pendent parties proved particularly
troublesome and led to less than definitive decisions on the
subject.
In Moor v. County of Alameda,' the Court was presented its
first opportunity to expand further the effects of the new-found
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. The anchor claim in Moor was
based upon violations of the plaintiff's federal civil rights by indi-
vidual police officers. Although no independent basis for federal
jurisdiction existed against the municipality, " jurisdiction over a
nonfederal claim was alleged to exist because of pendent juris-
over questions of state law might be protected, particularly where the state
issue is one of first impression. Comment, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Juris-
diction-The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons
not Party to the Jurisdiction-Conferring Claim, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 167
(1973). In all situations, the respective weight of the claims should be measured
so that a substantial state claim is not attached to an insignificant or less im-
portant federal claim. Id. at 167-68. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp.,
392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968).
The notion of federalism is a two-edged sword, however, as an argument
that refusing to allow a federal right to be vindicated in federal court is an
affront to the concept. That situation could occur when a plaintiff, bringing a
federal action, would be hesitant to proceed in two courts, federal and state, for
fear that the defendant in each would lay the blame on the other absent party.
In such circumstances, allowing a federal court to decide both claims would
serve the ends of federalism and of judicial efficiency. Fortune, supra note 8,
at 11.
14 See, e.g., Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 944 (1971); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir.
1971); Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1971); Beautytuft, Inc. v. Fac-
tory Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1970); F.C. Stiles Contracting Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970); Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1968); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364
F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966).
-411 U.S. 693 (1973).
'The anchor claim was based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (1976).
Congress and the courts had excluded parties such as counties and municipalities
from civil liability under this provision. 411 U.S. at 696, 710. See Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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diction. The Court was quick to perceive that such assertions of
federal jurisdiction over nonfederal claims would produce "subtle
and complex question[s] with far-reaching implications" 7 and thus
hesitated to issue an absolute statement. Instead, the Court empha-
sized the "significant difference"' between the facts in Moor and
those in Gibbs in holding that the lower court's decision to decline
joining the claims was a legitimate exercise of its discretion."9
Similar facts in Aldinger v. Howard" elicited another uncertain
response from the Court, faced with another of the "countless
factual permutations"3 in which federal jurisdictional questions
might arise. To permit a plaintiff to assert a state claim lacking
an independent basis of federal jurisdiction against an entirely
different defendant merely because the constitutional standard of
Gibbs had been met would be, in the words of Justice Rehnquist,
"quite another thing."3 Such action would run counter to the well-
established principle that the federal courts hold only limited juris-
27411 U.S. at 715. The exercise of pendent jurisdiction would have permitted
the plaintiff in Moor to reach the municipality for the actions of its police
officers under a theory of vicarious liability although the cause of action was
not permitted under federal law.
"Id. at 713. Gibbs involved no pendent party. Both the federal and non-
federal claim were asserted against the same party, while the addition of the
municipality in Moor would have required a new party to be added, a move
considered inappropriate by the Court.
21d. at 715-17. The addition of the state law claim would have required
the federal court to resolve difficult questions of California law upon which
state court decisions were sparse. The addition of another claim might also
have unduly complicated the case, particularly as it was being tried before a
jury. Id. at 715-16.
-427 U.S. 1 (1976). The plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976), see note 36 infra, alleging violations
of her federal civil rights due to the termination of her employment by a county
treasurer. Along with the federal claim, a state law claim alleging liability of
the county under a theory of vicarious liability was brought. 427 U.S. at 3-5.
31427 U.S. at 13. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow joinder of
various parties through the use of a number of procedural devices. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 13, 14, 20. The liberalized provisions of the Federal Rules are
seen by at least one commentator as a reason for the expansion of pendent
jurisdiction as the two are interrelated. The Federal Rules do not expand juris-
diction themselves, but emphasize the tendency of recent court decisions to
require a plaintiff to try his entire case at one time. Baker, supra note 22, at
765. This ability to join assorted parties, each of whom would bring problems
of jurisdiction, led the Court in Aldinger to limit its decision to the differences
between the facts there and those of Gibbs in determining that jurisdiction
would not be present. 427 U.S. at 13-16.
2427 U.S. at 14.
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diction, specifically outlined by Congress, while the state courts
are possessed of wide general jurisdiction.'
The determination in Aldinger of the proper parameters of the
federal courts' jurisdiction under the congressional grant involved
in that case ' established a second procedural hurdle which, with
the constitutional hurdle, must be cleared before jurisdiction will
be proper. Once the constitutional barrier is surpassed, the "rele-
vant statutory language"' must be given careful attention, partic-
ularly the language of the legislation from which the anchor claim
emanated. If power over a pendent party is asserted, the statute
should be construed in light of the power which Congress had
extended to the judiciary.' When the boundaries of jurisdiction are
dictated by a statute, whether it specifically excludes certain par-
ties from suit or designates the parties amenable to the court's
power, it would be improper to read the scope of pendent juris-
diction so broadly as to bring excluded parties back into court.'
In such situations, the power delineated by statute must provide
the limitations upon jurisdiction, regardless of how attractive a
more liberal approach might appear.
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court upon the ques-
tion of pendent jurisdiction, Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger,3 demonstrated the emphasis placed upon this statutory
and procedural analysis, examining the "posture in which the non-
' Id. at 15. The principle of the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts is
one of primary importance. To allow the federal courts to entertain cases not
within their jurisdiction would not be merely wrong but an unconstitutional in-
vasion of the powers reserved to the states. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COtRTS § 7 (1976). See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973);
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260
U.S. 226 (1922).
' See note 36 infra.
35427 U.S. at 17.
3 Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provided the basis for the suit in Aldinger
relative to the factual allegations of the case. It refers to deprivations of federal
civil rights by any "person." The jurisdictional basis for any civil action brought
to redress such deprivations is 28 U.S.C. S 1343(3) (1976).
3 427 U.S. at 17. As in Moor, the party's identity as a county would exclude
it from liability. See notes 26 and 27 supra. It would thus be improper to assert
jurisdiction over such a party merely because a nonfederal claim involving it
was also alleged. If there had been congressional silence on the subject or some
sort of tacit encouragement, a different outcome might have been possible.
38437 U.S. 365 (1978).
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federal claim is asserted."3 The survivors of the decedent, Kroger,
had filed a wrongful-death action against the Omaha Public Power
District (OPPD), based upon diversity jurisdiction. OPPD im-
pleaded Owen Equipment because of its right to contribution, and
the original complaint was amended to add Owen as a separate
defendant. Diversity was absent between Owen and Kroger, but a
motion to dismiss on those grounds was denied by the district
court. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision,
which was then reversed by the Supreme Court.
The uncontrovertible demand of the diversity statute' was pre-
sented as the reason for the Court's decision in Kroger. The guid-
ing jurisdictional principle of total and complete diversity was not
to be subverted for the practical needs of the convenience to the
litigants or judicial economy, regardless of how persuasive those
needs might be.' Not content with halting its discourse at that
point, the Court discussed additional elements which contributed
to its determination that pendent jurisdiction could not extend over
Owen, the pendent party, even if it had been properly impleaded.
The nonfederal claim had been asserted by the plaintiff and was
not ancillary in the definitive sense, having no relation to any
property under dispute. It was instead a new and independent
claim separate from the original and not contingent upon its
resolution.'
39 Id. at 373. This phrase is used to describe the procedural context of the
nonfederal claim. The focus is upon the factual and logical relation of the
nonfederal claim to the anchor claim; the status of the pendent party within
the action (principally whether it could be or was brought into the action
through use of the Federal Rules separate from any jurisdictional basis); and
the factors often ascribed to the exercise of the court's discretionary powers,
e.g., the availability of full relief to the parties in an alternative court.
40 The inviolability of the diversity statute is unquestioned. See American
Fire and Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank,
314 U.S. 63 (1941); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 1 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 575 (1806).
Commentators agree that this principle should be maintained and point out
that the courts, on occasion, have reached illogical conclusions by allowing the
addition of pendent parties in diversity cases while refusing to do so where a
federal question was involved. The opposite result, in the estimation of some
scholars, would be the only proper course. Fortune, supra note 8, at 18-19, 21.
4"437 U.S. at 377. So strict is the construction of the principle of complete
diversity that the overwhelming presence of these two factors in Kroger had no
effect upon the Court's decision. Its ruling necessitated a new trial of the issues
in the case although a jury verdict had previously been rendered. Id. at 369.
42 437 U.S. at 376. The typical assertion of ancillary jurisdiction involves the
rights of one of the defending parties or of a party whose rights might be
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The majority in Kroger was forceful in its statement of the law,
but the facts served to limit the effect of the decision. The Court
again refused to offer "any sweeping pronouncement upon the exist-
ence or exercise of [pendent] jurisdiction'' and adhered to earlier
equivocations that "[oither statutory grants and other alignments
of parties and claims might call for a different result."" In classes
of actions in which courts are granted exclusive jurisdiction, a
particularly strong argument would exist for the opposite conclu-
sion.' Yet recognition of this point, in the context of the Court's
reasoning, was nothing but dictum.'
In its four major decisions discussing pendent jurisdiction the
Supreme Court had failed to enunciate any firm rules for its broader
application. Not surprisingly, some lower courts, confronted with
the Court's uncertain approach, had been wary of using this pro-
cedural tool. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example,
had traditionally refrained from exercising the broader power which
pendent jurisdiction afforded," and refrained again in Ayala v.
United States."
irretrievably lost unless they are asserted in the ongoing action, such as where
specific property is under dispute. The adjudication of those rights usually follows
logically from the resolution of the original complaint and they are linked by
more than mere factual similarity. Neither generalization was true in Kroger,
however, lending additional support to the Court's decision.
43427 U.S. at 18. This language was clearly indicative of the Court's staunch
refusal to define just how far pendent jurisdiction might extend. Formulating
such a definition was considered both unwise and unnecessary by the Justices,
although their unwillingness to do so was counterproductive, contributing to
confusion within the lower courts.
4Id.
Id. Commentators following the Gibbs decision had astutely anticipated such
fact situations arising primarily under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Forcing a
plaintiff to divide his case between federal and state court obviously would prove
disadvantageous as there exists the possibility that he could lose both cases and
go uncompensated. Under such a procedural structure, neither defendant would
be bound by an adverse decision to which he was not a direct party. The coupling
of the state claim to the federal action would be the only equitable result. For-
tune, supra note 8, at 7-9.
"The Court specifically limited its decision to "the issue of so-called 'pendent
party' jurisdiction with respect to a claim brought under §§ 1343(3) and 1983."
427 U.S. at 18.
47Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975), afl'd, 427 U.S. 1
(1976); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub nom.
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d
136 (9th Cir. 1969); Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1969).
48550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
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The anchor claim in Ayala was brought against the government
pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. A nonfederal claim was
asserted against a third party, the manufacturer of government-
owned railroad cars which had exploded, injuring the plaintiff.
The Ninth Circuit, extensively referring to Moor and Aldinger,
rejected the asserted jurisdiction and held that such a decision
would be proper whether the anchor claim was predicated upon
a federal question or upon diversity. 9 Criticism of the decision
focused on the circuit's traditional disdain for the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction and on the tenuous precedent which supported
its argument.' However, the fact that two of the four leading cases
on the subject1 originated in the circuit would mitigate many of
the critics' objections.
Ortiz v. United States-THE COURT'S REASONING
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, faced with the claims of
Ortiz's survivors and the jurisdictional questions they engendered,
confronted a confusing and at times contradictory body of prece-
dent. Nevertheless the First Circuit quickly set out to analyze and
apply that precedent. The bifurcated standard of Gibbs and Al-
dinger was acknowledged as the proper test for determining the
validity of pendent jurisdiction.' Any obstruction in clearing the
11 Id. at 1200-01 n.8. The statement was made in reference to the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977), where
a nonfederal claim against a properly impleaded third-party defendant was
denied jurisdiction. If pendent jurisdiction had been asserted, diversity would
have been destroyed. The Ninth Circuit argued that a diversity anchor was no
more suspect than a federal question anchor, a view nullified in light of the
decision in Kroger.
'Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65, 71 n.8 (lst Cir. 1979). The holding
in Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969), one of the leading Ninth
Circuit cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction, was based in large part on
Katoaka v. May Dep't Stores Co., 115 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1940). That decision
predated Gibbs and its expansion of the concept of pendent jurisdiction beyond
the narrow limits of Hurn. The reasoning of the entire chain of decisions within
the circuit was suspect although the Supreme Court upheld it in Moor and
A Idinger.
51 Moor and A Idinger both had their beginnings in the Ninth Circuit. See
note 47 supra.
51595 F.2d at 71-73. The district court ruled that it lacked the constitutional
power to hear the nonfederal claim against Mimaya and cited Moor and Ayala
for the proposition. The First Circuit noted that the Court in Moor never
reached the article III issue, resting its decision upon the lower court's valid
exercise of discretion. Further, Moor and Ayala were easily distinguishable, re-
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constitutional hurdle was dispensed with by remanding to the
district court two questions for consideration: (1) whether a valid
and substantive federal claim existed' and (2) whether both claims
derived from a common nucleus of operative fact.'
Turning its scrutiny to the second, procedural hurdle, the posture
of the disputed claim, the court conceded that the allegations of
negligence against Mimaya were not ancillary in the sense of being
dependent upon the outcome of the anchor claim but were separate
and distinct.' This point had been deemed critical to resolution
of the jurisdictional questions in KrogeM but the First Circuit felt
that other factors were controlling. First, efficient judicial adminis-
tration would be promoted by litigation of all the claims in federal
court, the requisite forum under the anchor statute." Second, the
plaintiff's claim had not forced the addition of Mimaya to the action
since it was present due to the government's impleading, which was
supported by an independent basis of federal jurisdiction." Third,
the Federal Tort Claims Act did not expressly or implicitly negate
the exercise of pendent jurisdiction by a federal court over an
quiring the addition of a new party under the nonfederal claim while Mimaya
was already present in the action under the impleader by the government. Id.
at 71 n.8.
" Id. at 71. The Federal Tort Claims Act makes the government liable for
tortious conduct of one of its employees acting within the scope of his office or
employment for which "a private person would be liable . . . in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1976). Reference to the local laws of Puerto Rico would be required. Neither
party briefed or argued the point, so it was remanded to the district court. 595
F.2d at 71.
5595 F.2d at 71.
Id. at 72.
'o Kroger addressed the setting of such a claim and stated that it was "quite
different" from the type of nonfederal claim which previously had been viewed
as falling within the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts. 437 U.S. at
376. The effect of that finding is mitigated by its position as dictum within the
opinion. Id. at 376-77.
11 Where "the efficiency plaintiff seeks so avidly is available without question
in the state courts," 595 F.2d at 72, quoting Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker
Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1972), a different result might ensue.
51595 F.2d at 72. Although the independent basis for federal jurisdiction re-
ferred to related only to the claim between the government and Mimaya, it
still served as an additional factor weighing for the exercise of pendent juris-
diction. The Court had dealt with the question of pendent parties in Aldinger,
holding that the addition of a new party who otherwise would not be present
in the action presented "a more serious obstacle to the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction." 427 U.S. at 18. Mimaya was not such a party.
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associated nonfederal claim." The combined effect of these con-
siderations made an assertion of pendent jurisdiction proper, des-
pite the nature of the claim against the pendent party."
Any precedent which might have dictated a different result was
distinguished by the inapposite facts of the earlier cases. In Moor,
no independent basis of federal jurisdiction over the third party
existed as was provided in the instant caseY Mimaya would re-
main a party to the action absent the amended complaint because
of its impleader, the barrier discussed in Aldinger." Kroger was
inapplicable because it involved a diversity anchor rather than the
federal statute which was present in OrtizY Thus the basis for any
argument against the assertion of pendent jurisdiction was effec-
tively dismantled.
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
Analytically, the court composed a strong proposition for its
extension of pendent jurisdiction, but one that was far from un-
assailable. The independent nature of the claim against Mimaya
was openly acknowledged but largely neglected. The advantages
of judicial economy and convenience were given more weight than
" 595 F.2d at 72-73. The courts have generally given a liberal construction
to all the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act since its enactment in 1946.
See, e.g., United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Rayonier, Inc. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955). Compare the strict construction given the diversity statute. See cases
cited at note 40 supra.
10 "Given the posture of [the] claim against Hospital Mimaya, considerations
of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to [the parties] . . . favor such
jurisdiction here; its exercise will not, moreover, circumvent or 'flout [a] con-
gressional demand.'" 595 F.2d at 73. For a more complete judicial discussion
of such prudential considerations, see Roxse Homes, Inc. v. Adams, 83 F.R.D.
398 (D. Mass. 1979).
" Due to the impleader of Mimaya by the government, 28 U.S.C. S 1345
(1976) was applicable. See note 2 supra. Although the parties did not mention
its existence during the proceedings, the First Circuit properly took notice of it
in its opinion. 595 F.2d at 67.
11 "If the new party sought to be joined is not otherwise subject to federal
jurisdiction, there is a more serious obstacle to the exercise of pendent juris-
diction than if parties already before the court are required to litigate a state-
law claim." 427 U.S. at 18.
The plaintiff in Kroger was a citizen of Iowa, while the Omaha Public
Power District, the original defendant, was a Nebraska corporation. The plaintiff
in Ortiz brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See note I supra and
accompanying text.
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was justifiable.' The Federal Tort Claims Act, although never
negating the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, never endorsed the
doctrine, expressly or implicitly, a point which the court over-
looked.'
Despite its inconsistencies and weaknesses, however, the deci-
sion was probably proper' viewed against the backdrop of all the
earlier opinions, particularly those of the Supreme Court." Al-
though the Supreme Court had refrained from establishing the
exact contours of federal pendent jurisdiction, it had constructed
loopholes through which a court might guide an adroit reading of
an appropriate case. Dictum which prophetically anticipated the
facts of Ortiz by suggesting that the Federal Tort Claims Act
might provide an exception to the normal workings of pendent
party theory" and the extraordinarily narrow language of some
opinions7' furnished the First Circuit with the building blocks for
its decision. Purely pragmatic factors might have provided addi-
"The same factors had been present in Kroger. The Court had ruled that
they were not be be controlling, even if the consequences might appear incon-
venient and a waste of judicial resources. 437 U.S. at 377. See note 41 supra.
ISome conservative commentators have suggested that the most direct solu-
tion to the dilemma presented by such situations does not lie with judicial ex-
pansion of pendent jurisdiction. Allowing the courts to grant themselves addi-
tional power is a questionable answer at best. If Congress intended for the federal
courts to hold jurisdiction over related state claims when the anchor claim is
the Federal Tort Claims Act, it should grant that jurisdiction legislatively, an
approach already used in patent, copyright and trademark litigation. Shakman,
The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262,
267 (1968).
" Even commentators who have been critical of the expansion of pendent
jurisdiction would agree that its use is appropriate under some circumstances.
One such situation would be the avoidance of double litigation when the federal
courts are granted exclusive jurisdiction over certain actions. Shakman, supra
note 65, at 285.
"7Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger
v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693
(1973); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
"8 "When the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive, for example,
as in the prosecution of tort claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346, the argument of judicial economy and convenience can be coupled
with the additional argument that only in a federal court may all of the claims
be tried together." 427 U.S. at 18 (emphasis in original).
" "But neither the convenience of litigants nor considerations of judicial
economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
to a plaintiff's cause of action against a citizen of the same state in a diversity
case." 437 U.S. at 373 (emphasis added).
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tional motivations. The dissent in Krogerm had maintained that
the considerations of convenience to the parties, judicial economy
and inherent fairness to the litigants would be sufficient to induce,
if not demand, the assertion of pendent jurisdiction over all non-
federal claims if opportune circumstances were present. The First
Circuit briefly mentioned those factors in its opinion in Ortiz,
treating them as further reasons for its decision to extend pendent
jurisdiction. It was this combination of elements, regardless of
the weight attached to each respectively, which created the founda-
tion for the court's presentation of its strong, cogent argument for
the expansion of pendent jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The impact of Ortiz on air law will undoubtedly be strong and
immediate, opening the federal courts to actions which otherwise
might never have been pursued. At the present time, the representa-
tives of a decedent killed in a mid-air collision between aircraft
could sue the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act if the accident were caused by the negligence of a federal air
traffic controller. They might be prevented from pursuing the airport
or the controller personally in federal court if diversity between the
parties was absent. 1 This bar to suit would take on critical dimen-
sions if the aircraft involved in the crash were intrastate commuter
carriers,m as virtually all of the claimants would be denied access
to federal court. They could pursue their claims in state court, but
70 437 U.S. at 377-84. Justice White authored the dissenting opinion and was
joined by Justice Brennan.
71 The facts of this hypothetical are suggested by the facts in Corbi v. United
States, 298 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Pa. 1969), where a plaintiff sought to sue both
the federal government and an airline for negligent operation of its aircraft. The
court refused to allow the nonfederal claim to be joined with the federal anchor
claim. Accord, Kack v. United States, 570 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1978). Contra,
Jacobs v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Ariz. 1973); Davis v. United
States, 350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
"'The mid-air collision over San Diego in September, 1978, involving an
aircraft of Pacific Southwest Airlines presents a dramatic example of this situa-
tion. The craft was carrying early morning business travelers and employees of
the airline returning to company headquarters, most of whom were California
residents. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 1978, at 48-53. Any litigation which arises from
the crash may involve possible claims against both the federal government and
the airport and its employees, citizens of California, presenting a clear case
where the holding in Ortiz should be extended.
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the inconvenience and expense of adjudicating two separate suits
might prove so burdensome that some would choose to forego this
alternative. Adopting the approach of Ortiz, these parties would
now be allowed to assert their claims by utilizing the courts' power
of pendent jurisdiction over third parties. They would be provided
with one convenient forum so that all their rights could be litigated
and protected.
The impact of Ortiz will be felt in other areas of the law, as
other courts seize the First Circuit's opinion as new precedent for
the continued expansion of pendent jurisdiction.'" It may be true
that the decision reaffirms the reasoning and judgment of numerous
prior decisions," but it does so hard on the heels of the latest in
the series of Supreme Court decisions which have repeatedly failed
to specify how far pendent jurisdiction may extend in the federal
judiciary. There still exist serious problems associated with the
doctrine,' but perhaps now the Court will forsake its slow, case-
by-case evolution of pendent jurisdiction and deal straightforwardly
with those problems. The First Circuit in Ortiz fashioned the type
7- The First Circuit has since relied upon Ortiz in deciding a more recent
question of pendent jurisdiction in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Otero, 598
F.2d 627 (1st Cir. 1979). The court extended the effect of Ortiz to allow the
assertion of pendent jurisdiction over a party against whom no independent basis
of federal jurisdiction existed. The effect of the decision may be limited by the
peculiar facts of the case, however. Even the Ninth Circuit may seize Ortiz
as the basis upon which to reverse its long stand against the expansion of
pendent jurisdiction. In Mattschei v. United States, 600 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.
1979), the Ninth Circuit questioned the dismissal of a pendent claim against a
third-party defendant in light of Ortiz although it was precluded from making
any ruling on the question as the parties failed to argue the point.
Lower courts have cited Ortiz as support for the proposition that pendent
party jurisdiction may be exercised when one of the parties is sued under an
exclusive grant of federal jurisdiction. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F.
Supp. 335 (D.N.J. 1979). To do otherwise would constitute "a waste of judicial
resources and a hardship upon the litigants." 476 F. Supp. at 337 n.3.
" See note 24 supra.
'Although the boost to efficient judicial administration which a broad exer-
cise of pendent jurisdiction affords is worthwhile, commentators have warned
that such a goal, if given absolute priority, would be destructive of the judicial
system. Maximum efficiency could be achieved by use of a unitary court system,
but that is far different from what the founding fathers intended or contem-
plated and should be tenaciously avoided. The present expansion of pendent
jurisdiction has contributed to a deterioration of the principle of the limited
jurisdiction of the federal courts and of federal-state comity. It should be
checked, perhaps by legislative action. Baker, supra note 22, at 780-81. See also
Comment, The Extension of Pendent Jurisdiction to Parties Not in the Jurisdic-
tion-Conferring Suit, 20 Loy. L. REV. 176, 198 (1974).
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of logical, forceful opinion which the Supreme Court may have
been anticipating to provide it with a model for its own long-
awaited pronouncement of an unequivocal acceptance of a broad
view of pendent jurisdiction.
Barry R. McBee
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-JURY INSTRUCTIONS-In the Trial
of Conscious Design Defect Cases Based Upon Strict Liability the
Jury Henceforth May Be Instructed to Consider the Utility of the
Product and the Risks Involved in its Use. Strict Liability May Be
Imposed for Defective Design Which Enhances Injury After Initial
Impact. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.
1979).
Robert Turner was traveling on a two-lane rural road in his
1969 Chevrolet Impala sedan when he intentionally swerved off
the road to avoid a collision with a truck. Turner attempted to
return to the road but the car slid and overturned. The automobile
rolled once and the roof above Turner's head collapsed. Although
Turner had his seat belt fastened, he suffered a crushed vertebra
and was rendered a quadraplegic as a result of the collapse of the
vehicle's roof.
The Procedural History of Turner
Turner brought suit against the manufacturer of the automobile
and the automobile dealer alleging that the roof of his vehicle
had been defectively designed and that such design had caused an
enhancement of his injuries.' In November, 1976, the case was
I In a venue hearing the trial court held that liability will not be imposed
in Texas for a defective design which is not a producing cause of the accident.
The manufacturer had filed a plea of privilege to be sued in the county of its
residence. To maintain a cause of action in Texas in a particular county other
than the county of the defendant's residence a plaintiff must show: 1. one de-
fendant resides in the county of suit; 2. the party challenging venue is at least
a proper party; and 3. the plaintiff has a bona fide claim against the resident
defendant. See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(4) (Vernon 1964).
The manufacturer's plea of privilege was granted because the plaintiff could
not prove that he had a bona fide claim against the resident defendant. See
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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tried and submitted to the jury on the basis of strict liability for
failure to design a "crashworthy" automobile. A verdict was re-
turned for the plaintiff in the amount of $1,140,000. Judgment
was entered against the manufacturer and distributor, jointly and
severally, and a judgment of indemnity was entered in favor of
the distributor. The Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals' reversed
on two grounds. The jury instructions defining "unreasonably
dangerous" had been improper' and evidence of the source of a
safety standard had been erroneously excluded." The case was
remanded for new trial.
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). At the time of this hearing the
Texas Courts of Civil Appeals had not yet ruled on the existence of a crash-
worthiness cause of action. The Fourteenth Court of Civil Appeals in Houston
reversed, holding that a cause of action may be maintained for defective design
which enhances injuries. Id. at 497. The court adopted the view of Larsen v.
General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying Michigan law).
See note 14 infra. The Texas Supreme Court found no reversible error and
refused to review the decision.
2 The second appeal of this case was heard by the Beaumont Court of Civil
Appeals rather than the Houston Court of Civil Appeals (Fourteenth District),
which had heard the first appeal of the plea of privilege hearing, because of an
equalization of the dockets. Petitioner's Application for Writ of Error to the
Supreme Court of Texas at 2 (1978).
3The special issue defining "unreasonably dangerous" was:
Special Issue No. 1: "Do you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that at the time the automobile in question was manu-
factured by General Motors the roof structure was defectively
designed?
By the term 'defectively designed' as used in this issue is meant
a design that is unreasonably dangerous.
'Unreasonably dangerous' means dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics."
General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812, 815 n.2 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1978), rev'd, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
The definition of "defect" and "unreasonably dangerous" used by the trial
court is essentially that employed by the RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965). See text accompanying notes 20 and 21 infra.
The Beaumont appeals court held that this definition was erroneous and that
cases based on liability for design-enhanced injuries must be tried under a
theory which "involves a traditional balancing of gravity and likelihood of harm
against the burden of precautions to avoid the harm." 567 S.W.2d 812, 816 (citing
Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974)).
" The trial court had required that defendants' counsel refer to a 1973 federal
standard for roof strength as a "practice of the industry." The court of appeals
held that the source of this standard should be identified in order to allow
evaluation of its weight. General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812, 819
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978), rev'd, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
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On March 21, 1979, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals.' Plaintiff moved for rehearing,
urging the court to withdraw its March opinion. Held, reversed: In
the trial of conscious design defect cases based upon strict liability
the jury henceforth may be instructed to consider the utility of
the product and the risks involved in its use. Strict liability may
be imposed for defective design which enhances injury after initial
impact. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.
1979).
Texas Products Liability
The concept of strict liability in Texas is not new. In 1942
the Texas Supreme Court held that a manufacturer of contami-
nated food products could be held liable for injuries caused with-
out proof of negligence and notwithstanding a lack of privity.!
In Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,' the court imposed liability
not on negligence or the usual implied contractual warranty but
on "the broad principle of the public policy to protect human
health and life."'
Texas did not expand the concept of strict liability beyond food
products until 1967. The trend in other jurisdictions, however,
was toward imposition of strict tort liability for all types of prod-
ucts which caused injuries. The primary catalyst in this trend was
the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Torts,
Section 402A' [hereinafter referred to as section 402A]. Today
5Turner v. General Motors Corp., 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 272 (Mar. 21, 1979),
withdrawn, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
' See generally Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1104
(1960).
1139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). The plaintiff brought suit after
one of her children had died and other members of the family had been made
seriously ill by consumption of contaminated sausage manufactured by the de-
fendant. Id.
1 164 S.W.2d at 829. See Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in
Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 1 (1976); Sales, An Overview of Strict Tort Liability in
Texas, 11 Hous. L. REV. 1043 (1974).
'See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Sham-
rock Fuel Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965) provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or the consumer or his property is
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section 402A, or an approach substantially similar to it, has been
adopted as law, either legislatively or judicially, in the vast majority
of jurisdictions."
Product defects are of three general categories: manufacturing,
design and marketing. A manufacturing defect occurs when,
through some mistake in the manufacturing process, the product
does not meet the manufacturer's standards. A design defect occurs
when a product, which is marketed in the condition intended,
poses an inordinate risk of danger or inadequately protects from
harm because of its design. A product free from manufacturing or
design defects is considered defective if the product is marketed
with inadequate warnings or instructions.'
Liability has been imposed for two types of design defects. The
first is a defect which is the cause of an accident. The second type
is a defect which does not cause the accident but rather causes
or enhances a person's injuries. If such a defect occurs in the
design of an automobile, injuries may be caused or enhanced
through the occupant's "second impact" with the interior of the
vehicle. Liability may be imposed if the manufacturer has failed
to design its vehicle so as to minimize these injuries. In such a case
it is said that the automobile is not "crashworthy."' 3 Although the
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
The modem era of products liability was ushered in by Justice Traynor's
landmark decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
" See Walkowiak, Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective
Goods: "Reasonableness" Revisited?, 44 J. Am L. & CoM. 705, 706 n.7 (1979);
44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 207, 208-09 n.5 (1978).
2 Sales & Perdue, supra note 8; Sales, supra note 8. See generally Fischer,
Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974); Keeton,
Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973);
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufac-
turing and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969); Traynor, The
Ways and Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV.
363 (1965); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825 (1973).
13 See generally Sales & Perdue, supra note 8, at 16. See also Sales, Auto-
mobile Design Sufficiency and Enhanced Injury: A New Concept for No-Fault
Liability, 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 388 (1971). James Sales states that the crash-
worthiness doctrine "transform[s] the duty of the manufacturer to design an
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crashworthiness doctrine is a relatively new concept in products
liability, a majority of jurisdictions have imposed liability for
design-enhanced injuries."
automobile suitable for travel on the road into a duty to design a vehicle suitable
as a protective container ... ." Id. at 389.
The crashworthiness doctrine may also be invoked as to airplane design.
See also Galerstein, A Review of Crashworthiness, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 187
(1979); Galerstein, Aircraft Crashworthiness: Who Sets the Standard, 28 FED'N
INS. COUNSEL Q. 258 (1978); Schaden, Aircraft Crashworthiness, 14 TRIAL 40
(1978); Note, Aviation "Crashworthiness": An Extrapolation in Warranty, Strict
Liability and Negligence, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 415 (1973).
14Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying
Michigan law) was the first to hold an automobile manufacturer responsible
for injuries aggravated in the occupant's second collision with the interior of
the vehicle. The court reasoned that accidents on highways are so common
and numerous that, while a manufacturer does not have a duty to design an
accident-proof vehicle, it does have a duty to protect consumers against any
foreseeable risk of harm. A majority of states have followed this reasoning,
although it should be noted that many decisions are from federal courts stating
what they believe the state courts would hold. See, e.g., Fox v. Ford Motor Co.,
575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Wyoming law); Knippen v. Ford
Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d
259 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976) (applying Missouri law);
Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Kentucky law);
Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying
Virginia law); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974) (applying
Indiana law); Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974) (apply-
ing Illinois law); Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974) (apply-
ing Louisiana law); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974)
(applying Rhode Island law); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d
1270 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying Iowa law). See also Isaacson v. Toyota Motor
Sales, 438 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.C. 1976); Anton v. Ford Motor Co., 400 F. Supp.
1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975); Dy-
son v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Horn v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 2d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976);
Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976); Friend v. General
Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968); Farmer v. International
Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 553 P.2d 1306 (1976); Garst v. General Motors
Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young,
272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Friedrich v. Anderson, 191
Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831 (1974); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 41 A.D.2d 54, 341
N.Y.S.2d 846, aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 151, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 305 N.E.2d 769 (1973);
Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); McMullen
v. Volkswagen of America, 274 Or. 83, 545 P.2d 117 (1976); Mickle v. Black-
mon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205
N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973); Ellithrope v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn.
1973); Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829
(1974); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975).
Only a few jurisdictions follow the contrary holding espoused in Evans v.
General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836
(1966) (applying Indiana law) [overruled by Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565
F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Indiana law)]. The court in Evans held
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In the companion cases of McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc."
and Shamrock Fuel Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks," the Texas Supreme
Court expressly adopted section 402A and extended strict iiability
to products other than food."' Although "the concept of defect is
central to a product liability action brought in a strict tort lia-
bility theory, whether the defect be in conscious design, or in the
manufacturing of the product, or in the marketing of the product,"1
the Texas courts have not formulated a precise definition of "de-
fect." The explanatory notes to section 402A define a defect as
that while an automobile should be made reasonably safe for intended uses,
liability will not be imposed for failure to make it safe for collisions, an un-
intended use. See McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va.
1971), aff'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973); Walton
v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969). See also Brown, Products
Liability: The Genesis of "Second Collision," 51 N.Y.S.B.J. 21 (1979); Nader
& Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALF. L. REV. 645
(1967); Sales, supra note 13; Note, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second
Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REV. 475 (1977).
1 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
16416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
17 The court stated "we are further of the opinion that as a logical proposi-
tion, the rule stated in Decker should be held applicable to defective products
which cause physical harm to persons." McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967).
"
8 Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979). See
Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
19 See, e.g., Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Tex. 1975) (defective
product "exposes its user to an unreasonable risk of harm when used for the
purpose for which it was intended"); Pittsburgh Coca-Cola Bottling Works v.
Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. 1969) (product defective if it is "not reason-
ably fit for the purposes for which it was intended to be used"); Ethicon, Inc.
v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no
writ) (defect is a "condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which
will be unreasonably dangerous to him") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, comment g at 351 (1965)).
The meaning of "defect" is flexible in Texas, see Sharp v. Chrysler Corp.,
432 S.W.2d 131, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), and the courts have proceeded on a case-by-case basis. Helicoid Gage
Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Sales & Perdue, supra
note 8, at 7.
Texas courts have not decided whether "unreasonably dangerous" is meant
as a definition of "defect" or whether one must prove that a product is defective
and that such defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous. See, e.g.,
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 347 n.1 (Tex. 1977); Rourke
v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d at 798; Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d at 532; Heli-
coid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d at 575. See
also Keeton, Product Liability, supra note 12. "It is unfortunate perhaps that Sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that as a basis for re-
covery it must be found that the product was both 'defective' and 'unreasonably
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"a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which
will be unreasonably dangerous to him."' "Unreasonably danger-
ous" is defined as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community and
as to its characteristics." 1 Many jurisdictions,' including Texas,"
dangerous,' when as a matter of fact the term 'unreasonably dangerous' was only
meant as a definition of defect." Id. at 42. "[I]t must be obvious that while differ-
ent categories of defects are recognized, there has been no resolution of the ulti-
mate question of the meaning of defect." Id. at 34.
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, comment
g (1965).
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes S 402A, comment
i (1965).
'2See, e.g., McCullough v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 587 F.2d 754, 759 (5th
Cir. 1979) (applying Mississippi law); Burton v. L.O. Smith Foundry Prods. Co.,
529 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir. 1976) (applying Indiana law); Karjala v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying Minnesota
law); Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co., 499 F.2d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1974) (apply-
ing Kansas law); Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th
Cir. 1973) (applying Louisiana law); Scheller v. Wilson Certified Foods, Inc., 114
Ariz. 159, 559 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1976); Slepski v. Williams Ford, Inc., 170
Conn. 18, 364 A.2d 175, 178 (1975); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., Inc.,
268 N.W.2d 830, 835-36 (Iowa 1978); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288
Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64, 69 (1970); Steinberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 576
P.2d 725 (Mont. 1978); Brown v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 268 Or. 470, 521
P.2d 537 (1974); Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 19 Wash. App. 515, 576
P.2d 426 (1978), aff'd, 91 Wash. 2d 345, 588 P.2d 1346 (1979); Vincer v. Esther
Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794
(1975). But see Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (product defective in design if it fails to perform safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect or if benefits of design do not outweigh
risk of danger inherent therein); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,
501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (plaintiff need not show, in addition
to existence of defect, that such defect rendered the product unreasonably
dangerous).
Other jurisdictions have used similar language regarding the utility and risk
of products. See, e.g., Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065, 1068
(1976); Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978); Burke v. Illinois Power Co., 57 Ill. App. 3d 498, 373 N.E.2d 1354,
1367 (1978); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978);
Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132, 136 n.1 (1976); Pegg
v. General Motors Corp., 391 A.2d 1074, 1082-83 (Pa. 1978); Lamon v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wash. 2d 345, 588 P.2d 1346, 1350 (1979). Various
authors have advocated the use of balancing considerations in determining
whether a product has an unreasonably dangerous defect. See, e.g., Dickerson,
Product Liability: How Good Does a Product Have To Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 330
(1967); Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in
Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1303, 1306-07 (1974); Keeton,
Manufacturer's Liability, supra note 12, at 565; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
2 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978);
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have adopted the expectations of the ordinary consumer as the
basis for the definition of unreasonably dangerous.
The Texas courts have formulated a "bifurcated test" for appli-
cation in defective design cases in determining a product's unrea-
sonable danger. In Henderson v. Ford Motor Co.," the Texas
Supreme Court first advocated, but did not mandate, the use of
such an instruction. The court asked:
Did some feature of the form or material or operation of the
[automobile air filter] housing threaten harm to persons using the
automobile to the extent that any automobile so designed would
not be placed in the channels of commerce by a prudent manu-
facturer aware of the risks involved in its use or to the extent that
the automobile would not meet the reasonable expectations of the
ordinary consumer as to its safety? (emphasis added)'
In General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins," the Texas Supreme Court
mandated the use of this bifurcated instruction. The instruction
had been given in the conjunctive. The jury had been told that the
product must threaten harm to the extent that it would not be
placed in the channels of commerce by a prudent manufacturer
aware of its risks and to the extent that the product so manufac-
tured would not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary
consumer as to safety." The court, citing Henderson, however,
expressly disapproved of the use of the conjunctive and stated that
the proper instruction should be in the disjunctive, using "or" rather
than "and." "The objective of the alternate test of unreasonable
danger, i.e., from the vantage of the prudent supplier, is to avoid
completely foreclosing liability because of either the visibility or
the complexity of the alleged defect from the vantage of the con-
sumer.""6 Under Henderson and Hopkins, therefore, it would
appear that the jury is required to determine whether the product
design meets the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Miller v.
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 568 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1977); Rourke v. Garza, 530
S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975); Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell,
511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
"Id. at 92.
21548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
:i Id. at 347 n.1.
8 Id.
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or whether a prudent manufacturer would have placed such a
product in the stream of commerce.
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
Subsequent to the Henderson decision, General Motors Corp. v.
Turner," was tried on the merits. The case was submitted to the
jury with instructions defining defect solely from the perspective
of the ordinary consumer.' The submission did not include the
prudent manufacturer alternative. The Beaumont Court of Civil Ap-
peals held that such instructions were erroneous and that in a second
impact or injury enhancement case the jury should be instructed
to consider four balancing factors in determining whether a design
is defective. These considerations were the utility of the product
versus the likelihood and gravity of risk, the availability of substi-
tute products, the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product, and the obviousness of the danger or
existence of suitable warnings and instructions. " Although the
Texas courts had employed balancing language in their products
liability opinions, the Beaumont court was the first to hold that
balancing factors should be employed in the instructions to the
jury."
The Texas Supreme Court granted Turner's writ of error from
29 567 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977), rev'd, 584 S.W.2d 844
(Tex. 1979).
• See note 4 supra.
" General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1977), rev'd, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). The instructions advanced
by the Beaumont court were a reaction to the writings of various commentators
and a response to many Texas decisions. In Metal Windows Prods. Co. v.
Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), suit was brought in strict liability and negligence for defective design
of a sliding glass door through which the plaintiff had attempted to walk. The
court noted that the purpose of such doors and the reason for their popularity
was the illusion of spaciousness which they created. Even if an absence of
decals on the glass was a defect, the risk of collision due to transparency did
not outweigh the utility and value of the doors. Similar language was employed
in Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. 1975) and Helicoid Gage Div.
of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp.,
568 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1978); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
"2General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1977), rev'd, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
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the Beaumont decision. The first opinion was delivered on March
21, 1979.' The principles of strict liability were reaffirmed as
applied to all design defects, including those which merely en-
hance injuries.' The court reasoned that the purpose of strict
liability is protection of the public against harm caused by defective
products and that, therefore, there should be no distinction be-
tween the liability of a manufacturer whose product causes the
accident and the liability of a manufacturer whose product causes
damage or injury only.' Quoting from a Seventh Circuit opinion,'
the court held that there is no rational basis for limiting liability to
primary impact injuries."
The court then held that the trial court had committed reversible
error in the definition of "unreasonably dangerous" which had
been submitted to the jury.' The correctness of the instructions
given were to be determined by the Texas Supreme Court's previ-
ous writings, and "[i]t was made clear in Henderson and Hopkins
that the ordinary consumer and prudent manufacturer tests were
intended to be alternatives. The inclusion of one, or the other, or
both, in the definition of 'unreasonably dangerous' is determined
by the state of the evidence."'" These cases contemplated, the
court stated that evidence regarding these two tests would be
admissible in the trial of conscious design defect cases. The court
held that evidence had been introduced by the manufacturer to
establish that it was acting prudently under the countervailing
considerations of the risk versus the utility as to the design of the
roof; therefore, exclusion of the prudent manufacturer alternative
had been error.'
Although the court remanded Turner because of the trial court's
failure to include the reasonable manufacturer alternative test,
it held that the bifurcated instructions of Henderson and Hopkins
33Turner v. General Motors Corp,, 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 272 (Mar. 21, 1979),
withdrawn, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
1 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 273.
35 Id. at 274-75.
'Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1977).
3 Turner v. General Motors Corp., 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 272, 274-75 (Mar.
21, 1979), withdrawn, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
"22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 273. See note 4 supra.
22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 276.
0 Id. at 276-77.
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would no longer rule.' The court noted that such a test had no
place in a design strict liability submission and stated: "We are
persuaded to these conclusions by the inconclusiveness of the idea
that jurors would know what ordinary consumers would expect in
the consumption or use of a product, or that jurors would or
could apply any standard or test outside that of their own experi-
ence and expectations." The court further noted that the prudent
manufacturer standard is a "negligence concept" which focuses on
the conduct of the manufacturer to determine if due care was
exercised in the adoption of a design."
While the court overruled the bifurcated instructions, it ex-
pressly disapproved of the balancing factors which the Beaumont
court had held should be incorporated into "crashworthiness" in-
structions. It explained that just as there should be no difference
between the liability for products which cause the accident and
those which merely enhance injuries, so should there be no differ-
ence in the jury instructions employed. Balancing factors were
held to be improper for submission to the jury in either kind of
design defect case." The court held that henceforth no definition
of "unreasonably dangerous" should be given in the trial of con-
scious design defect cases based upon strict liability.' It recognized
that many products have both utility and danger and that evidence
may be presented regarding the balancing factors enumerated by
the Beaumont court. It observed, however, that formulating spe-
cific balancing factors would be difficult, and therefore, precise
factors should not be made a part of the definition of "unreasonably
dangerous." The court explained that any definition of "unreason-
41 id. at 277.
4Id.
'Id. The court also held that the evidence of the source of a safety standard
had been properly excluded.
" Id. at 275.
4Id. at 273. The jury instructions to be given were, in pertinent part, as
follows:
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the
time the [product] in question was manufactured by [the manu-
facturer] the [product] was defectively designed?
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant
a design that is unreasonably dangerous.
Id. at n.1.
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ably dangerous" contained a fictitious standard that may be mean-
ingless to the jury."
On petitions for rehearing, the court, two and one-half months
later, withdrew its initial opinion and substituted another." This
opinion reaffirmed in all essential respects, and in virtually the
same language, the principles set forth in the initial opinion. The
court, however, affirmed the judgment of the trial court for the
plaintiff and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.
The court again held that strict liability should be imposed for
failure to design a crashworthy automobile." The turnabout was
in the holding as to the jury instructions given and as to the in-
structions which the court mandated for future use. The "ordinary
consumer" jury instructions given at the trial level were classified
as "harmless error."" The court, using the same language, stated
that the disjunctive definition never was required under Henderson
and Hopkins.* It commented that the additional perspective of
the reasonable manufacturer was to be available for the benefit
of the injured plaintiff if the defect in question was apparent or
if the ordinary consumer had a lack of expectations as to the
details of the design in question."' The court did not discuss the
evidence presented by the manufacturer to show that it was act-
ing prudently. It observed that because the jury found the roof of
the automobile to be defectively designed under the ordinary
consumer test it was immaterial that they might have also so found
under the prudent manufacturer test." The court also commented
that while it previously had not addressed specifically a point of
error regarding use of only one-half of the bifurcated instructions,
it had affirmed many cases where only the ordinary consumer
definition had been given."'
Although the trial court's instructions were held "harmless
error," the supreme court promulgated a new set of jury instruc-
IJd. at 277.
"'Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
41 Id. at 847.
491d. at 850-51.
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tions to be employed henceforth. Citing with approval several
Texas cases which had used balancing language,"4 the court held
that juries in conscious design defect cases based on strict liability
are to be instructed to consider the utility of the product and
the risks involved in its use when such considerations are justified
by the evidence presented. Specific balancing instructions were
not to be enumerated.5 The Henderson and Hopkins bifurcated
test was overruled for the same reasons cited in the court's first
opinion."
The Impact of Turner on Products Liability Actions
The immediate impact of Turner on many members of the legal
community may be one of consternation. A complete about-face
within a span of two and one-half months may be interpreted as
a symptom of a fickle court. Although the supreme court used
basically the same reasoning to support its first and second opin-
ions, the interpretations of the holdings of Hopkins and Henderson
are diametrically opposed. In the first opinion the court held that
these cases mandated the use of the prudent manufacturer alterna-
tive if evidence presented showed that the manufacturer may have
been acting prudently. In the second opinion the alternative was
held to be available at the instance of the plaintiff if the defect
was apparent or if the ordinary consumer did not have expecta-
tions as to the design in question." One is left to wonder whether
the court itself ever really knew what these cases stood for regarding
jury instructions. Additionally, one wonders why the court in its
second opinion affirmed the trial level use of the jury instructions
which in the same opinion it overruled.
Despite any possible criticisms which may be raised regarding
541d. at 851.
5d. The jury instructions to be given are, in pertinent part as follows:
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the
time the [product] in question was manufactured by [manufacturer]
the [product] was defectively designed?
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant
a product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into
consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its
use.
Id. at 847 n.1.
"I d. at 851. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
5' See text accompanying notes 40 and 51 supra.
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the Turner opinion, the Texas Supreme Court has dramatically
changed the law regarding products liability in Texas and has
changed it for the better. There no longer is any doubt that a
manufacturer can be held responsible for the design of his product
if it causes injuries despite the fact that it is not the producing cause
of the accident. Just as the doctrine of crashworthiness may be
applied to the design of an automobile, so too may it be applied
to the design of aircraft. While crashes are not a normal and in-
tended use of aircraft, the number and severity of accidents are
significant enough that a cause of action will exist under Turner
for failure to minimize adequately the injuries which might result
from such accidents. 8 While there are inherent problems with
judicial application of the crashworthiness doctrine," the court aptly
observed that a manufacturer should not escape responsibility for
a defective design which causes injuries merely because the de-
sign did not produce the accident. Texas joined the majority of
other jurisdictions in so holding.'
The Turner case will change the focus of the Texas jury in
products cases from examination of the ordinary consumer's ex-
" It is a common assumption that designing an aircraft to be "crashworthy"
is a fruitless matter because aviation accidents cannot be survived. This assump-
tion is ill-founded. Investigation has revealed that many deaths and injuries
could have been avoided if the airplanes involved had been designed to avoid,
for example, second impact with protruding objects or hazards created by fire.
See Note, Aviation "Crashworthiness": An Extrapolation in Warranty, Strict
Liability and Negligence, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 415, 415-18 (1972).
"1 It was observed in General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978), rev'd, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979) that "prose-
cution of a lawsuit is a poor way to design a motor vehicle, for the suit will
almost invariably emphasize a single aspect of design to the total exclusion of
all others." Id. at 815 (quoting Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d
1, 7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579 (1974)). The court also noted that "[als in the case
of food and drugs, the imposition of safety standards on the automobile indus-
try can most likely be achieved better by a consistent application of regulatory
standards drawn up by experts and kept current by research, rather than by
ad hoc decisions of inexpert judges and juries." 567 S.W.2d at 815 (quoting
O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 N.W.U.L. REV. 299, 375 (1963)).
The problems encountered in apportioning damages due to defective design
and due to the negligence of the persons involved in the accident in crashworthi-
ness cases are discussed in Note, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second
Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REV. 475 (1977). See generally Foland, Enhanced
Injury: Problems of Proof in "Second Collision" and "Crashworthy" Cases, 16
WASHBURN L.J. 600 (1977); Hoenig & Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness":
An Untenable Doctrine, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 578 (1971); Sales, supra note 13.
e0 See note 14 supra.
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pectations and/or prudent manufacturer's conduct to examina-
tion of the product itself. The discarded bifurcated test had come
under well-deserved attack. The ordinary consumer half of the
test, or section 402A definition, has been labeled a "nebulous
test" and "vague and imprecise."' Section 402A was formulated
during the infancy of strict liability in tort, and there has been a
growing recognition that the test has limitations, especially regard-
ing defectively designed products. An ordinary consumer does
not have expectations regarding various aspects of many complexly
designed products,"" or the consumer's expectations may be too
high or too low.' Additionally, a problem is posed if the injury
has resulted from a product the defect in which is apparent; re-
covery should not be limited only to those cases where the product
is more dangerous than contemplated. The prudent manufacturer
alternative of the bifurcated test was formulated to cure these
problems, but this test, which compels examination of the manu-
facturer's conduct, has distinct negligence overtones."'
The Texas Supreme Court's choice of an alternative to the
bifurcated test was a wise one. Unless we are to make a manu-
facturer an insurer of his product, a showing of defect must be
a requisite to recovery. If a defect is to be required for recovery
there is no way to avoid a risk-benefit analysis,' especially in de-
sign cases." Many products are unavoidably unsafe and can never
be made safe for use." Other products pose some risk of harm but
the installation of safety devices or the use of a different design
may impair the usefulness of the product or make its cost pro-
61 Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J.
30, 37, 39 (1973).
"I1d. at 37. The ordinary consumer's expectations as to airplane design may
be particularly inappropriate to examine in determining defectiveness because of
the complexity of aircraft design.
O Fischer, supra note 12, at 350.
"See, e.g., Turner v. General Motors Corp., 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 272, 277
(Mar. 21, 1979), withdrawn, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
6'Keeton, supra note 61, at 39.
6 The utility-risk analysis is not so necessary in manufacturing defect cases
because a defect may be inferred when a product leaves the hands of its manu-
facturer in an unintended condition. See Comment, The Developing Definition
of Defect in California Products Liability, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 263 (1978).
"
TSee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes g-k § 402A
(1965); Fischer, supra note 12, at 343-44.
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hibitive" The "unreasonably dangerous defect" question must be-
come "whether, given the risks and benefits of and possible alterna-
tives to the product, we as a society will live with it in its existing
state or will require an altered, less dangerous form.'
Lynne Parkhurst
68 Sales & Perdue, supra note 8, at 14-16.
"Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 22, at 1307. The authors
suggest various balancing factors to be considered but note that reference to
utility and risk should not necessarily be made part of the jury instructions. Id.
at 1308 n.29.
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